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7Still in transition?
An editor’s notes
When we with my colleagues at the Department of Comparative and Institutional Economics 
of Corvinus University of Budapest started to organize the 2nd International Economic Forum 
on Reform, Transition and Growth in 2016, we knew that we step on uncharted, yet extremely 
interesting territory. Our colleagues, Professor Emerita Katalin Szabó and Professor Emeritus 
Balázs Hámori, who was also chair of the organizing committee, had already participated 
in the 1st round of a conference put together by high profile international universities from 
China, Russia, Serbia and Hungary. We were eager to get to know the colleagues Kati and 
Balázs had been working with, and to host them at Corvinus at the 2nd conference round 
organized by our department.1
The title – International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth – was both 
familiar and slightly worrisome. After all, having experienced almost three decades of post-
communist transition in this part of the world, can we still hold a conference with this title? 
What does it mean in the second part of the 2010s to talk about ‘reform, transition and 
growth’? Who transits where? Can we still conceptualize a characteristic post-communist 
transition as an ongoing development? Or are we merely talking about the past? We received 
papers and were looking forward to receiving the guests. And when they actually arrived, 
and had their respective conference lectures, we were both surprised and calmed down: It 
appeared that researchers from a variety of post- (and in the case of China: still) communist 
countries still had a lot to talk about their experience in reform, transition and growth as a 
historically deeply embedded yet ongoing process.
Such a diverse conference necessarily produces a diverse set of papers that, when compiled, 
turn into a diverse collection of conference proceedings. This is what you, dear reader, have in 
front of you right now: A compilation of six characteristically different, yet in some sense still 
related papers that give a f lavour of what had been presented at the Forum back in November 
2016.
The first paper, written by the renowned comparative economist, Bruno Dallago of the 
University of Trento is about the Euro and the Eurozone crisis: a par excellence transition 
story taking place in the heart of Europe with a great impact on both post-communist 
countries (including those already in the Eurozone) and the entire world. Dallago argues that 
the Eurozone is not doomed to fail, but policies and institutional practices need to adjust to 
new realities and pragmatism is needed both in ‘resilient’ and ‘vulnerable’ countries of the 
monetary integration. The bottom line, he says, is that fiscal restriction, demanded by the 
‘resilients’ can and should not prevent from tangible economic recovery, whereas inevitable 
1  Within our department, a number of people made considerable efforst for the success of the conference. I will name 
only one, however, who probably worked the most on this project: Associate Professor András Székely-Doby, who was 
the chief organizer.
8reforms can and should not be avoided by the ‘vulnarables’. In other words, the Eurozone 
should survive, but not at any cost. Dallago offers some recommendations on how to achieve 
such a new pro-Euro equilibrium.
The paper by Dragana Mitrovic and Marko Tmusic from Belgrade University explores the 
relationship between institutional development and economic growth in context of the post-
communist transition. As this is undoubtedly a two-way interaction, they examine both the 
impact that institutions make on growth, and the economic preconditions for developing 
economic and political institutions conducive for growth. They argue that the interaction 
between institutions and economic development depends on initial conditions as well as on 
the level of development that a particular country has so far attained. Hence, they conclude, 
no unitary approach can be adopted towards policies shaping institutions and/or growth. 
The course of post-communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe has taught a tough 
lesson, they claim, as the actual number of success stories has so far remained limited. One of 
the key elements of failure, they argue, has been the lack of adequate industrial policies that 
exposed a number of transition countries to de-industrialization and the accumulation of 
large trade deficits.
Csaba Moldicz of the Budapest Business School, University of Applied Sciences 
contributed a comprehensive paper on the Taiwanese development as a unique case of post-
WWII transitions. Taiwan, the breakaway island-state at the Chinese coast, has become a 
fast developing Asian tiger and one of the world’s leadings economies in past decades. 
Preconditions, again, played an important role in Taiwan as the Japanese colonial heritage in 
state administration assisted economic development. Taiwan also shared some development 
policies with other fast developing Asian economies, such as Hong-Kong, Japan, Singapore 
and South Korea. However, it still went along its own way, creating a globally competitive 
economy based on relatively small company size and an army of locally based small and 
medium sized enterprises. US aid policies and high household savings were also instrumental 
in attaining high, sustained growth rates, while the special relationship with mainland China 
has made the Taiwanese economy actually even larger than it appears in official statistics.
Irina Vasilenko of the Lomonosov Moscow State University came up with a highly 
provocative piece on diverging paths of globalization and modernization. Westernization of 
eastern economies and societies, she claims, resulted in social and economic decay in the 1990s, 
whereas a renaissance of markedly traditional, nation-, state-, family- and religion-oriented 
values has assisted in reversing the process of disintegration. In her account, preserving 
the ‘socio-cultural identity’ of non-western societies remain a condition for development, 
whereas ‘promoting Western ideas of individualism, success, human rights, neoliberalism 
in these countries caused a negative reaction, when popularizing of these western values was 
called >>imperialism of human rights<< in the countries of the East.’ A new, more successful 
practice of modernization must be ‘built on the reconsideration of national traditions’, she 
maintains, so that we shall never experience the return of the 1990s, when ‘national cultural 
identity of the masses was destroyed, the nation has lost self-esteem, and morale was low’. 
Vasilenko’s essay reads like an anti-west, anti-enlightenment manifesto, which is certainly 
(and luckily) not the only approach to understanding socio-economic developments in the 
east. Yet, precisely because we believe in the values of enlightenment and individual freedoms, 
including the freedom of expression and dissent in values and argumentation, we are glad to 
present this rather controversial essay.
9Balázs Hámori and Katalin Szabó of Corvinus University of Budapest present a paper on the 
institutional conditions of innovation in Hungary. Explaining the conspicuously weak post-
1990 Hungarian performance in innovations, they argue that insufficient business morale (with 
respect to adherence to formal contractual relations), clientele building and interventionism 
by the state, soft budget constraint and – relatedly – insufficient entrepreneurial spirit in 
terms of low propensity to risk-taking are the major obstacles. These factors, they claim, are 
not independent but form a “system”. To survive under such conditions, “economic actors 
should deliver outstanding performance in building relationships to state institutions and 
expanding their relational capital, not in competition or innovation. If they succeed in doing 
so, they can get higher rents without taking any particular risk.” This behavioural pattern 
is unlikely to be changed on the short run. Nevertheless, it is important to take account of 
the factors inhibiting innovation-based social and economic development in a country once 
considered a leading transition economy of Central and Eastern Europe.
Finally, my own piece is concerned with the rise of populism as a new, increasingly influential 
political phenomenon both in western and eastern societies, and with interpreting it in 
institutional economics terms. Based on the political science literature, I consider populism 
as a ‘degraded form of democracy that holds elections in regular intervals as rituals of popular 
legitimation’, yet makes democratic political choice effectively constrained and controlled by 
incumbents. From an institutional economics point of view, I maintain, this is explained by a 
need for reducing political transaction costs – a source of uncertainties societies prefer to keep 
under check at times of crisis and fast, unpredictable social and economic transformations.
In sum, our volume represents the diversity of problems, methodologies and intellectual 
approaches to some of the transitions the world has been experiencing in past decades. 
As social, political and economic changes have considerably accelerated in a globalized 
world, transitions are by definition continuing – and will be so. Hence, the term ‘transition’ 
eventually turns out to be more apt than ever, and our conference appears to be a valuable 
attempt at fulfilling it with actual content. Finally and very sadly, I would like to dedicate this 
volume to the memory of Professor Emerita Katalin Szabó, a key intellectual force behind this 
conference, who tragically passed away last year.
Zoltán Ádám
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 (The Song of Igor's Campaign, Translated by Vladimir Nabokov)
And yet it moves! (“Galileo Galilei, 1663, 
according to The Italian Library”, by Giuseppe Baretti, 1757.)
Between strife and progress: 
The Eurozone after Brexit
Bruno Dallago1
Abstract
One of the main problems of the Eurozone is the growing and considerable split 
between vulnerable and resilient member countries. The split pre-existed the crisis, 
but it was the institutional and policy incompleteness of the Eurozone and the 
management of the crisis that made the split evident and potentially dangerous for 
the monetary union. The European Union is gaining time by increasing the use of 
flexibility that exists in the treaties and pacts and coupling it with the supportive 
ECB attitude and action. However, it is difficult to see how the monetary union can 
continue in the long run by imposing unreasonable costs to and causing prolonged 
economic decline of vulnerable countries and if some of its member countries are 
unable or unwilling to implement the necessary reforms. External and internal 
events added a significant economic and financial danger to European integration, 
and an even greater institutional and political threat. The paper analyzes the causes 
and consequences of the division between resilient and vulnerable countries. The 
paper concludes that the EU and its member countries should pragmatically revise 
and relaunch the process of European integration and suggests important steps in 
this direction.
JEL classification: E02, E61, F15, G01, 052
Keywords: Crisis, Eurozone, European Union, Institutions, Policies, Reforms
1 Professor of Economics, University of Trento, Department of Economics and Management. Email: bruno.dallago@unitn.it
The strife of the princes
against the pagans
has come to an end,
for brother says to brother:
“This is mine,
and that is mine too,”
and the princes have begun to say
of what is small:
“This is big,”
while against their own selves
they forge discord,
[and] while from all sides with victories
the pagans enter the Russian land.
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During the crisis, the Eurozone2 tested and proved its resilience, yet the monetary union is 
at a crossroads. Participating in a larger and more liquid financial market and larger and 
more competitive goods market at lower interest rates and prices are sizeable advantages 
for the Eurozone member countries, their governments, firms, financial organizations, and 
their consumers. Yet presently these advantages are overshadowed by sizeable disadvantages 
and costs in terms of lost output and unemployment and growing public and private debt in 
various countries and the threat of financial instability. Monetary integration continue to be 
backed by remarkable popular and political support, along with the more obvious support 
of the business community, albeit weakened in later years, but growing again after Brexit 
referendum on 23 June 2016. Yet recurrent crises continue to loom around.
The prolonged economic difficulties of the Eurozone and the lack of institutional and 
political breakthrough show that time may not work in favor of the monetary union. It is 
difficult to see how the monetary union can stay together in the long run by imposing 
unreasonable costs to a significant part of its citizens and if some of its member countries 
are unable or unwilling to implement the reforms and policies necessary to revitalize their 
economies. 
1. Optimum currency areas and the Eurozone
One important problem of the Eurozone is that it includes both vulnerable and resilient 
countries. Vulnerable countries have uncompetitive or unbalanced economies or important 
sectors (such as the financial sector) and need policies to adjust and strengthen their 
situation. Being members of a monetary union, they are unable to do so because they miss 
policy sovereignty and the necessary reforms are costly and need time to yield effects. Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and, to a certain extent, Ireland are vulnerable countries. These 
countries suffered particularly damaging consequences from external shocks. Countries 
having more competitive and balanced economies do not need policies or major reforms 
to adjust their economies and are resilient. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are resilient countries. Obviously, each group has internal 
differences and degrees of vulnerability and resilience.
To make the Eurozone fully sustainable, the performance of vulnerable economies should 
converge to that of resilient countries and their financial situation be stabilized or substantial 
and credible progress in the direction of a complete union and growth policies should take 
place. Missing progress and being the Eurozone still far from being and optimum currency 
area (OCA) (Dallago 2016a, De Grauwe 2014), the rules of monetary integration and the policy 
measures required by countries impose growing costs and stagnation on them and may cause 
2  The Eurozone, or euro area, is the monetary union of 19 European Union (EU) member states which have adopted 
the euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender. It includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The remaining 9 countries, with the exception of Denmark and obviously the 
United Kingdom, have to join when ready to do so. The Eurosystem is the monetary authority of the Eurozone and 
the European Central Bank (ECB) is the common central bank which implements the monetary policy for the entire 
Eurozone. The ECB has a president and a board which also includes the heads of national central banks of the Eurozone.
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their economic decline. A common currency leading to economic decline is neither desirable 
nor sustainable. In these circumstances, it may also be difficult to keep negative political 
consequences under control. An unfavorable external context may make this outcome more 
likely and serious.3
2. The problem and its consequences
The financial crisis originated in the United States, broke out in summer 2007 and reached 
the European Union through different channels and events (Eichengreen 2016). The crisis 
had serious financial and real effects and ultimately institutional effects, with different 
consequences in distinct member countries. Financial distress was at its peak in 2010-2011. In 
2010 Greece and Ireland needed urgent rescue, followed in 2011 by Portugal and Cyprus, while 
Italy was in a critical situation with its public finances, although it could go on without any 
bailout. Spain followed in 2012, due to the financial distress of its private banks. Yet economic 
distress, unemployment and the fall of GDP, to levels that in 2017 are still lower than before 
the crisis in several Eurozone countries, continue to be worrying realities.
Vulnerability came from different sources: unbalanced and uncompetitive real economies 
with significant current account deficits (all with the partial exception of Ireland and Italy), 
unbalanced public finances and public debts (Greece, Italy and in part Cyprus and Portugal), 
distressed private banks that had to be rescued by means of public sources (Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain), the massive outflow of foreign and domestic capital following the international crisis 
and the burst of domestic bubbles (Cyprus, Ireland and Spain) (De Grauwe 2011, IMF 2012). 
The Eurozone policy approach was to require that countries in distress stabilize their public 
finances by means of restrictive financial policies and internal devaluation. The EU, the 
ECB and the IMF (the “Troika”) secured rescue packages to each country, after progress in 
stabilization policies obtained positive assessment. This was curing the effect, overlooking 
the causes of financial distress. The situation was particularly serious in 2011, when the 
president of the ECB had to announce that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to calm 
financial markets.
While financial stabilization was a must under the blow of international financial markets, 
the particular policy measures and priorities sponsored by the “Troika” jeopardized the long-
run sustainability of vulnerable economies and in the end the very success of stabilization 
policies. A better approach was to deal also with the causes of vulnerability, not only its 
effects, with the aim of moving the Eurozone closer to an OCA. This required that effort 
was concentrated on reforms, both structural and institutional at both the Eurozone level 
and national level, investments and technical progress. Indeed, vulnerability derived from 
3  The IMF (2015b) foresees secular stagnation to remain as long as demand is weak and inflation is expected to stay 
below target for an extended period, amid constraints on monetary policy at the zero lower bound. This situation 
causes an increasing likelihood of damage to potential output. See also IMF (2014). According to Lawrence Summers 
(2014), since the start of the crisis policies concern was focused on avoiding secular stagnation. This concern arose 
primarily from the long-run effects of short-run developments and the inability of monetary policy to accomplish 
more when interest rates already reached their lower bound. Roubini (2017) attributes the lack of inflation to supply 
side shocks.
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ineffective economic structures and institutions and the lack of investment, along with 
financial disequilibrium and distress. It also derived from the institutional incompleteness 
of the economic and monetary unification and from asymmetric policies: common monetary 
policy and fiscal policies under the restrictive hand of the convergence criteria (Dallago 
2016a). Moreover, the distrust of international markets towards these countries and the 
euro jeopardized the effect of stabilization policies; thus public debts increased significantly 
compared to GDP. Initially, debt service skyrocketed due to much higher interest rates that 
these countries had to pay in financial markets (but not on EU-ECB-IMF loans).
Vulnerable economies needed to stabilize, reform and invest to grow. These goals are not 
easy to combine at national level in countries members of an incomplete monetary union. One 
problem is timing mismatch: while stabilization must be decided and implemented rapidly, 
growth policies and reform require lengthy preparation, are costly, slow in implementation 
and ever more so in delivering their effects. This explains in part – along with the dominant 
policy theories, the concern for moral hazard and the lack of needed resources in vulnerable 
countries – why the Eurozone insisted so much in imposing structural reforms and disregard 
the more ambitious but more effective institutional reforms.4
This timing mismatch caused stabilization policies to have a depressive effect through 
the financial multiplier (the ratio of a change induced in national income by the change in 
government spending) and increased the debt to GDP ratio (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). This 
is because during a recession public revenues decrease and social expenditures increase, thus 
causing public deficit and debt to increase. At the same time, employees and pensioners and 
young people paid most of the costs of stabilization through growing unemployment, wage 
and pension cuts, shrinking welfare and/or increased taxation.
A negative side effect for the economy is that these social groups, whose income is rather 
modest if not low, have high propensity to consumption. Their disadvantage translated into 
lower domestic demand. Although current accounts improved significantly in vulnerable 
countries after stabilization measures (often due to decreased import more than to increased 
export) and mild surpluses replaced sizeable deficits, the negative effect over GDP of 
shrinking domestic markets could be compensated by increasing exports only in small and 
open economies. Moreover, due to this policy mix vulnerable countries saw their distance 
4  According to the European Commission, structural reforms address impediments to the fundamental drivers of growth 
by unshackling labor, product and service markets to foster job creation, investment, and productivity. These reforms 
aim to enhance an economy’s competitiveness, growth potential and adjustment capacity. See http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/structural_reforms/index_en.htm. See also Canton et al. (2014). As a matter of facts, in vulnerable 
countries the policy accent is mostly, sometimes nearly exclusively on labor and consists primarily of changes to the 
labor market or the pension system that reduce production costs, ease dismissals and decrease public expenditures. 
Institutional reforms consist of modifying the basic formal rules and governance of the economy. Although these 
reforms are usually decided and defined by national governments, their nature, implementation and effect is mostly 
at microeconomic level. They aim at improving the efficiency of the economy, strengthening the effectiveness of 
policies, promoting competition and liberalization, reinforcing incentives, decreasing transaction costs, decreasing 
the tax wedge over economic activity (e.g. broadening the tax base through fighting tax evasion), encouraging R&D 
and innovation and at the end improving competitiveness. In short, while structural reforms in their strict sense 
aim at regaining competitiveness by cutting costs, institutional reforms aim at doing so by improving the efficiency 
and innovation capability of the economy. These were important components of the Lisbon strategy and play an 
important role in the Europe 2020 strategy, but hardly in the management of the Eurozone crisis.
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from resilient countries in GDP, incomes and consumption increase substantially, after 
years of catching up before the crisis. In 2015, the real GDP of vulnerable countries was still 
significantly below the level it had at the beginning of the crisis (except Ireland) while the 
Eurozone real GDP was a bare 3 percent above that level (Chart 1.). In these same years, real 
GDP of China nearly doubled and that of the United States increased by more than 10 percent. 
Within the EU, the real GDP of Poland increased by nearly 30 percent and that of Germany 
by more than 7 percent. The revival of the EU economy in 2016 and 2017 slightly improved the 
situation.
The depressive effect of stabilization policies and price deflation decreased the denominator 
more than the nominator in the deficit/GDP and debt/GDP share, resulting in the increase of 
both ratios for years after the crisis (Chart 2.). the predictable outcome was that most Eurozone 
countries, including various resilient countries, violated the convergence parameters for 
financial stability, of 3 percent of deficit over GDP and 60 percent of public debt over GDP.
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
Eurozone-19 RESIL VULN EU-28 United States VULN without Greece and Ireland
Chart 1. The internal divergence of the Eurozone:
Quarterly GDP in constant 2000 prices, (Q4 2007=100)
Source: Own elaboration on OECD data
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3. Toward a new awareness
After the initial, strict insistence on austerity and internal devaluation,5 under the pressure of 
the worsening economic situation and the changing stance of the international community 
– particularly the IMF and the Obama US administration – the Eurozone policy control and 
policy making started to look for alternatives and timidly move.
The crisis had important effects in the Eurozone, in line with OCA theory previsions. In 
particular, it revealed the large and deep economic and financial differences among member 
countries. Equally important, these effects exposed the incomplete institutional foundations 
of the euro, the insufficient common solidarity, the excessive formalism of convergence 
criteria and the rigidity of the Stability and Growth Pact. These weaknesses existed before 
the crisis and were fully Eurozone-made. However, they went largely unnoticed, thanks to the 
sustained f low of private capital to countries in need, which allowed interest rates to converge 
5  Austerity policies include measures that aim at reducing public budget deficits and public debts by increasing 
revenues and decreasing expenditures, both to solve insolvency risks and to show creditors and credit rating agencies 
the government’s determination to strengthen fiscal discipline (see Blyth 2012). Internal devaluation is a set of policy 
measures aiming at increasing external competitiveness by decreasing domestic prices. This is done mainly by 
reducing wages and social contributions paid on labor in order to decrease labor costs (see Decressin et al. 2016, 
Decressin and Loungani 2015, IMF 2015a).
Chart 2. The compliance of Eurozone member  
countries with convergence criteria, 2015
Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat data
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downward.6 A further negative effect of the external shock was that individual member 
countries followed initially their own short-run interest, thus jeopardizing the common 
purpose and mutual trust. The EU insistence on financial austerity and internal devaluation 
was in a sense a device for avoiding worse consequences in an institutionally incomplete and 
insufficiently cooperative club of countries. In this situation, the common currency actually 
made economic and financial convergence more difficult, since it deprived member countries 
of policy f lexibility.
However, reading the situation in this way risks to confuse the effect with the cause. The 
international crisis raised doubts over the institutional architecture and the governance of the 
Eurozone economy and the euro, in spite of the ECB increasingly resolute intervention and 
its interest rates constantly lower than in the United States. One problem was that external 
financial and monetary events contributed to the instability of the Eurozone economy and 
had internally asymmetric consequences for vulnerable and resilient countries. Perhaps more 
important in the long run, the international crisis exposed the weak institutional, economic, 
financial and policy base of the euro and the entire European construction and highlighted 
the need to intervene at the roots of the problems.
It is perhaps the fundamental failure of the former and the difficulty of the latter that 
contributed to shift the accent to what appears technically and politically easier: making 
labor cheaper and more f lexible in the short-medium run, with scant concern for long-run 
consequences. To be sure, these policies may appear easier to implement thanks to the weakness 
of trade unions and social opposition in vulnerable countries and the promise to bear fruits 
faster than other policies. They also apparently guarantee the solvency of distressed national 
budgets. However, these policies often end up in lower fiscal revenues for the state and 
have negative macroeconomic consequences (Decressin et al. 2016, Decressin and Loungani 
2015, IMF 2015a). Moreover, structural reforms imposed upon vulnerable countries as part 
of internal devaluation policies made these countries stepping back in the quality of their 
international specialization and weakened their investment in human capital. This effect 
enlarged further the divergence between resilient and vulnerable countries, particularly in 
technology intensive sectors (Palan 2013, Palan and Schmiedeberg 2008, 2010).
The recognition that austerity and internal devaluation policies were ineffective and possibly 
worsened the economic situation is not sufficient for economies to emerge from the crisis. The 
present wider, pragmatic and mostly tacit use of f lexibility built in Eurozone institutions and 
treaties and the ECB action are useful to gain time. However, only institutional and structural 
reforms and policies better in line with the real situation, European and national alike, can fix 
the problems of the Eurozone.
Lack of political determination at national level may prevent or delay the implementation 
of reforms. Unfortunately, the rules governing the common currency itself makes more 
difficult and costlier for vulnerable countries to finance those reforms. There is a danger that 
the increase of debt to GDP ratio in vulnerable economies may cause the retreat of vulnerable 
economies into a low level equilibrium. Negative consequences may extend to resilient 
Eurozone countries both via the integration among economies and tensions on the euro (EC 
2014).
6 Long-term interest rates coincided at approximately 4 percent between 2002 and 2007 in Eurozone countries.
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The ECB determination to do “whatever it takes” to support the euro helped easing financial 
and monetary distress (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012). However, these measures could not 
solve the deep reasons for instability, nor could they complete the institutional setup of the 
Eurozone, as the ECB repeatedly warned.7
Since the Eurozone is neither a perfect optimum currency area (Dallago 2016a) nor has it a 
sufficient political and social support to compensate for important shortcomings, austerity 
and internal devaluation policies guarantee that the problematic financial situation of 
vulnerable countries does not jeopardize the monetary union and the financial stability of 
resilient countries, nor does it require automatic financial transfers from resilient countries. 
It is in a sense a least common denominator for cohabitation. However, this takes place at the 
price of limited and less effective policy instruments. Restrictive policies are implemented 
to the disadvantage of the economy and in particular employment and wages and hence 
consumption. Austerity as a policy mantra is wrong and dangerous (Blyth 2012), yet not much 
else is at hand in the present Eurozone.
The evidence of past policy failures and the commitment of vulnerable countries to the 
rules of the monetary union, even at significant or very high economic and social costs, are 
perhaps changing the scene. Slowly a new policy consensus is developing to address the 
apparently intractable Eurozone problems. Yet new dangers appeared. Incomplete Eurozone 
institutions with no bailout, non-monetary financing, rigid budget constrains have deprived 
the Eurozone of powerful countercyclical policies and led to bank-sovereign interdependence 
as a not so hidden way to circumvent institutional rigidities preventing better solutions to 
financial distress. Large stocks of undiversified national public debt securities are held by 
national banks even after the Euro fostered some cross-border financing. This added up to 
the growing burden of non-performing loans (NPL). The vulnerability of Eurozone countries 
increased, because adverse shocks to sovereign solvency could interact with adverse shocks to 
bank solvency. The ECB quantitative easing program started in March 2015 aims at solving this 
problem by transferring public debt bonds from private banks to national central banks. At 
the same time, the ongoing construction of a European banking union aims at strengthening 
large, systemic banks.
What the Eurozone finds particularly difficult is to identify a new, long-run strategy 
capable of incorporating the dramatic changes that the international crisis brought about in 
the international financial and economic system, the new perception that markets have of 
the common currency, and the deeply changed inter-country relations within the Eurozone. 
During the crisis, time horizons of governments and people dramatically shortened. It 
is therefore fundamental that a long term institutional, economic and political strategic 
perspective is worked out, however difficult this may be. This is necessary to induce the 
Eurozone member countries to cooperate for the sake of the common good.
7  “[W]e cannot expect those divergences to be addressed through means such as permanent transfers from 
economically resilient countries. The euro area was not created to be a union with permanent creditors and debtors. It 
is an area where each country, by exploiting its comparative advantages and the opportunities afforded by the Single 
Market, and by converging to the highest standards in terms of competitiveness and income, must be able to stand 
on its own two feet.” (Draghi 2015)
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Such perspective should include institutional reforms for completing the Eurozone 
architecture, institutional and structural reforms to make the Eurozone economies more 
competitive and policies supporting growth and common pool resources for investment. 
Completing the institutional architecture of the Eurozone is the most daunting goal, since 
it impinges upon national sovereignty of member countries and the stance and priorities of 
policy making. The most important institutional reform areas at the Union level include: a) 
broader European Central Bank mandate, b) creation of a Eurozone banking federation, and 
c) stronger EU budget and fiscal union with common bonds. All run into technical problems 
and above all serious political problems and opposition, a critically important issue since such 
reforms may require a change in the EU treaties.
It is clear that something needs to be done, but the precise features of this something are 
still unsettled. Preferences of European governments and countries are still different and 
perhaps apart. The crisis and Brexit changed the attitudes of Europeans, particularly in 
vulnerable countries. However, there continues to be a prevalent majority support to the euro 
(Eurobarometer 2016, Guiso et al. (2014), Roth et al. (2016), Stokes 2015). This fact, together 
with the endurance of vulnerable countries in implementing austerity, are apparently re-
establishing some degree of inter-country confidence and trust. The economic and political 
precondition for a change may be building up.
4. Proposals and solutions
A consensus is developing among policy makers and scholars that policies and actions which 
were followed and implemented so far did not work. Those policies may have helped to avoid 
the worst consequences, including open default of some member countries or even the break-
up of the Eurozone. However, such policies failed to bring vulnerable economies back to 
growth, which weakened the performance of resilient countries and are not sustainable in 
the long-run. However, scholars and policy makers disagree on what exactly should be done at 
this point to restore the sustainability of the Eurozone and promote the growth of vulnerable 
economies and whether this is a goal that is really worth pursuing.
A number of proposals for breaking up or even ending the euro were advanced also by 
serious scholars, even if this is sometimes considered in the lack of better viable alternatives 
(Kawalec and Pytlarczyk 2013, Steinherr 2013, Stiglitz 2016). Also the event of one country 
leaving the common currency comes recurrently back, particularly in the case of Greece and 
more recently Italy. Analyses of the conditions for a country to leave the euro and for the 
others to adapt (Bootle 2011) and estimates of the probable cost to countries leaving the euro 
(Guglielmi et al. 2017, Mchugh 2014) were prepared. The institutional set up of the Eurozone, 
though, makes the event of one country leaving the euro institutionally impossible and in any 
event so costly and disadvantageous, that the topic is mostly confined to political populism. 
However, no one can exclude that a country can be actually obliged to leave. As to the break-up 
of the Eurozone, it is difficult to understand why two or more small euros would be better 
and less problematic than one euro and preferable to national monetary sovereignty. The 
euro is one or none, at least for political reasons. The fact that the recent revival of Eurozone 
economies does not prevent the future return of dangerous shocks.
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Catastrophic scenarios apart, there are proposals that go in the direction of making the 
Eurozone better viable. They can be grouped into four proposals which are advanced, 
considered and even partially implemented. The first proposal consists of keeping austerity 
policies and softening them by using the f lexibility that exists in European agreements 
(EC 2015) or through continuing expansionary monetary policies. This is the present broad 
settlement and practice in the Eurozone. It includes the slowing down of the implementation 
of the budget adjustment foreseen in the fiscal compact, recalling exceptional circumstances; 
the definition of the budget deficit in structural terms; and expansionary monetary policies 
within the present mandate of the ECB, in conjunction with persistently low inflation. 
However, within Eurozone institutions a push towards a new fiscal stance is already evident 
(EC 2016, ECB 2016). The advantage of this proposal is to keep pressure on countries to 
balance their finances and reform, while leaving some room for expansionary policies. The 
disadvantage is that adjustment processes under these circumstances are too slow and costly 
to the population.
A second proposal, which can be considered as complementary to the preceding one, is the 
setting up of a European plan for investments. This is one of the important aims of the present 
European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker.8 The European Investment Plan, 
so-called Juncker plan, foresees an overall investment of €315 billion over three years (2015-
2017). Of these, €21 billion is financed and guaranteed by the newly established European 
Fund for Strategic Investments set up by the European Union and the European Investment 
Bank. The rest should be financed by public and private contributions, with a leverage of 
15. The advantage of this proposal is that it adds a European push to national economies, 
while financing industrial and infrastructural projects. The disadvantage is that, however 
important, it is not sufficiently massive to really improve the situation of vulnerable countries.
A third proposal, again complementary to the preceding ones, consists of proceeding 
to complete Eurozone institutions. A first, important step was moved in 2014 with the 
foundation of the European banking union.9 The banking union consists of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism. The third pillar, the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for bank deposits in the euro area, is still waiting for formal 
approval. These mechanisms are based on a common financial regulatory framework ("single 
rulebook"). Steps are moved also in the direction of a unified European capital market.10 
Bolder interpretations in the monetary fields consider transforming the ECB in a full lender 
of last resort. There are two versions of this view: lender of last resort only for private banks 
(Winkler 2014)11 or also for governments (De Grauwe 2014, Goodhart and Schoenmaker 
8  Claeys et al. (2014), Veugelers (2014). See also https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-
plan_en. The Commission proposes to extend the duration of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and 
provide at least €500 billion by 2020 and €630 billion by 2022 (https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/
files/2-years-on-investment-plan_en_2.pdf ).
9 Pisani-Ferry et al (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/index_en.htm
10  “With the banking union, we are laying the foundations for a more complete financial integration in the future. But 
to be fully comprehensive, a single financial market must also extend to capital market integration.” (Draghi 2017). 
See also the European Commission’s Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union http://ec.europa.eu/finance/
capital-markets-union/index_en.htm
11  Winkler (2014) addresses four arguments that are used to explain why it is acceptable to have the ECB as a lender of 
last resort for banks, while this role for governments should be rejected.
Bruno Dallago20 The Eurozone after Brexit
2014)12. Although various economists, particularly in Germany, oppose such views (Illing and 
König 2014),13 this transformation of the ECB role is presently de facto nearly accomplished, 
albeit through secondary markets in the case of public debts.
A further issue on which there is some technical debate concerns solutions to be found for the 
more than 1,000 billion euro worth of non-performing loans (NPL) held by European banks. At 
a seminar in Luxembourg on 30 January 2017, organized by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the chairman of the European Banking Authority (EBA), Andrea Enria, proposed in his 
speech the establishment of a kind of “bad bank” – a European Asset Management Company – 
with the target of acquiring up to 250 billion euros of non-performing loans from EU banks.14
Mutualization of sovereign debt was an important issue at stake, particularly in 2011 and 
2012, when vulnerable countries were in serious distress and interest rates on their sovereign 
debt were rapidly and significantly increasing. Various scholars and policy makers advanced 
the idea of introducing bonds, defined in different ways, in order to pool the sovereign debt 
of Eurozone countries under joint liability, typically up to 60 percent of GDP (Beetsma and 
Mavromatis 2012, Claessens et al. 2013). Predictably, this proposal met strong opposition, 
particularly by the governments of resilient countries. In fact, they were afraid to soften 
excessively the budget constraint of vulnerable countries15 and foster moral hazard, thus 
being called to pay the bulk of the cost. However, it is fair to observe that the ECB quantitative 
easing program includes a partial form of debt mutualization. The advantage of these 
proposals is to ease the financial situation of vulnerable countries without really jeopardizing 
that of resilient countries. The disadvantage is that they do not really deal with the economic 
situation, with the need for expansionary policies and for reforms, neither with the keen issue 
of how to coordinate policies and reforms.
A fourth proposal is to set up a common economic government, or at least a European 
minister of finance, as a first step towards political unification. This proposal was advanced 
also by the presidents of the central banks of France and Germany in a common article 
(Villeroy de Galhau and Weidmann 2016). Such an accomplishment would give a compelling 
institutional and policy background to the management of the economy and finances, 
but would open new questions. If the ministry would be a rigid controller and enforcer of 
convergence criteria, but without own financial resources, political conflicts with national 
12  According to De Grauwe (2013), the ECB should also be the lender of last resort in the government bond markets 
of the monetary union, in order to prevent countries from being pushed into bad equilibria by self-fulfilling fears of 
liquidity crises in a monetary union. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2014) maintain that, after the introduction of the 
euro, the national central banks continued to act as lenders of last resort because bank supervision remained at the 
national level. Since supervision moved to the ECB through the new banking union, so should the lender of last resort 
function for the larger, cross-border, banks.
13  Illing and König (2014) argue that it is questionable whether the purchase of government bonds of distressed 
countries is included in the ECB's mandate. They also suggest that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would 
be better suited to act as a lender of last resort for governments and it should be given access to ECB credit facilities 
in order to fully perform this function.
14  The proposal received the approval of Klaus Regling, Managing Director of ESM. Apparently EBA's plan does not 
include the sharing of bank risks among EU states. See ttps://www.esm.europa.eu/speeches-and-presentations/
seminar-andrea-enria-eba-chairperson
15  Wyplosz et al. (2011) stress that eurobonds would reduce the odds of a sovereign crisis at the cost of creating a 
serious moral hazard and softening discipline promotion. See also Claessens et al. (2013).
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governments could follow. If the ministry would have a serious budget and if the role is not 
limited to the control of national budgets, it would be necessary to manage politically the 
inter-country distributive consequences of fiscal policies and perhaps also their inflationary 
effects. While the latter could be rather easily manageable, given the independence of the 
ECB, the former would require compensatory agreements among countries. Simplification 
on the side of policy making would consequently be compensated by increased complexity in 
the management of consequences. A European minister with limited sovereignty, acting as a 
pivot and coordinator of national ministers, together with a form of partial debt mutualization 
(e.g. up to the 60 percent of GDP) seem more realistic achievements for the time being. When 
these achievements show their positive effect, common government building could proceed 
to more ambitious forms.
A good starting point for proceeding towards a more effective monetary union would be to 
reach a consensus on past accomplishments and on the problems ahead and understand how 
different proposals could be combined to be more effective. Unfortunately, there is no such 
consensus and there is still a fundamental disagreement on how policies should be changed 
and institutions completed. Disagreement also concerns the future of the common currency 
and the fate of some of its member countries.
5. From muddling through towards a fuller integration?
The fundamental problem of the Eurozone is its necessity to implement institutional reforms 
and foster economic growth, while continuing fiscal consolidation. As stressed by OCA theory, 
the inability to pursue these goals was due to the institutional incompleteness of monetary 
unification. Additional reasons were the weak effectiveness of enforcement of common rules, 
the scarce willingness and inability of various national governments to comply and reform, 
the conflictual coordination and declining trust among member countries. Such inability 
explains the dominance of short term stabilization objectives and policies, duly supported by 
questionable policy rigidities and national interests. This approach unfortunately overlooked 
that the problem of the Eurozone was not only one of financial disequilibrium, but mainly one 
of decreasing competitiveness of economies. The fact that policies disregarded the long term 
structural aspects of the competitiveness of national economies and had asymmetric national 
effects led to poor performance and permanent damages to the European economic potential 
and the life of European citizens, particularly in vulnerable countries.
The Eurozone is confronted with the price of past mistakes and with new challenges and 
dangers. Some of the mistakes were common, others were in national opportunism and 
consequent moral hazard, still others were in the lack of cooperation by resilient countries 
before discipline was effective. The accusation that introducing the euro too early, before 
the necessary accomplishments of political and fiscal integration and amidst incomplete 
institutions, was a mistake, hits a point (Nuti 2015, Pisani-Ferry 2012, Rosefielde and Razin 
2012). However, we should not forget that the euro was conceived also as a device for fostering 
European economic and political integration and as an important expedient to urge member 
countries to reform their economies. The fundamental conceptions founding the common 
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currency are the Werner Report (1970) and the Delors Report (1989). It is worth recall briefly 
these milestones.
The Werner Report was not particularly concerned with imposing hard fiscal discipline 
to the members of the monetary union, it foresaw inter-country transfers and transfers 
of sovereignty. It also considered political coordination and integration as necessary 
complements to the monetary union.16 Indeed, “only the global balance of payments of 
the Community vis-à-vis the outside world is of any importance. Equilibrium within the 
Community would be realized at this stage in the same way as within a nation's frontiers, 
thanks to the mobility of the factors of production and financial transfers by the public and 
private sectors.” Clearly this Report was under the influence of the federalist view of European 
integration that backed its construction since the Treaty of Rome.
The EU soon evolved into an inter-national kind of integration, of which the Delors Report 
is perhaps the most significant expression. In this Report national governments have 
greater role in the integration of Europe. Logically in this perspective, the lack of a common 
government of the economy requires that countries are bound in their financial freedom, in 
order not to destabilize the economic and monetary union. In a process integrating countries 
featuring many differences “a wide range of decisions… [should] remain the preserve of 
national and regional authorities” … “within an agreed macroeconomic framework and be 
subject to binding procedures and rules.” The potential impact that these decisions have 
“on the overall domestic and external economic situation of the Community and their 
implications for the conduct of a common monetary policy” require that national policy 
making is coordinated and checked. Only such coordination and check “would permit the 
determination of an overall policy stance for the Community as a whole, avoid unsustainable 
differences between individual member countries in public-sector borrowing requirements 
and place binding constraints on the size and the financing of budget deficits.” (Delors Report 
1989, p. 14). Unfortunately, this Report overlooked that the performance of single economies 
also depend on other factors (such as investments or the existing industrial structure), that 
may require additional resources that countries with the greatest need for investment may 
not have, because of the austerity imposed on their economies.
In the perspective of optimum currency area theories, the Werner Report relies on the 
mobility of resources, in particular labor, and on price f lexibility, neither one sufficiently high 
in most European economies. The Report also presupposes the existence of transfers of public 
resources, a problematic feature in a process integrating countries with overall disciplined 
and balanced public finances and other countries which, for various reasons, are unable or 
politically unwilling to do so. The Eurozone conundrum is fundamentally here: insufficient 
resource mobility, particularly labor, and structural problems that prevent resource mobility 
from contributing to the economic and financial convergence of countries. At the same time, 
open markets together with divergent economies and unbalanced public finances revers the 
16  “To ensure the cohesion of economic and monetary union, transfers of responsibility from the national to the 
Community plane will be essential. These transfers will be kept within the limits necessary for the effective operation 
of the Community and will concern essentially the whole body of policies determining the realization of general 
equilibrium. In addition, it will be necessary for the instruments of economic policy to be harmonized in the various 
sectors.” (Werner Report 1970, p. 10)
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f low of financial resources to the disadvantage of vulnerable countries in times of distress 
and distrustful markets.
It was the Delors Report that shaped the European integration process, but this was in 
a different, inter-national perspective. In the Eurozone, exchange rate adjustments are no 
longer available to correct national economic imbalances. Abandoning the Werner Report’s 
concern with “the global balance of payments of the Community vis-à-vis the outside world”, 
the Delors Report concentrates on national imbalances.17 There is thus a need to put these 
imbalances under control, but also of reforming economies in order to make national 
economies more efficient and avoid such imbalances.18
The problem with reforms, however important they are and leaving political and social 
issues aside, is that they meet a crucial timing problem: reforms promise advantages in the 
long run but they are costly in the short time. This opens three problems. First, vulnerable 
countries cannot support their reforms by depreciating their currency or running higher 
budget deficits and they may lack the necessary financial resources. Second, there is a problem 
with the inter-temporal (and perhaps inter-generational) allocation of costs and advantages. 
Third, it is not easy to coordinate reforms with the need for expansionary policies. Indeed, in 
the short run reforms absorb resources that cannot be used to expand the economy and may 
create uncertainty, thus jeopardizing the expansion.
The process of European integration was thus progressively transformed – from its political 
start based on a common vision based on the tragedy of World War II and idealism and in 
order to avoid the unpleasant choice between the nation and the common good – into a 
technical, nearly mechanical process. This choice worked reasonably well for decades and 
produced wellbeing and political stability. The crisis recalled Europeans back to the hard 
reality of the economy as also a social and political undertaking and to the necessity to remind 
that economic integration cannot disregard these dimensions.
So far the daunting problems of the Eurozone were managed through the accommodating 
monetary policy and the relaxation de facto of convergence criteria. These adjustments gave 
time, but could not solve the deeper problems. For the misfortune of the Eurozone and the 
European Union, the rest of the world did not stay motionless, nor did its internal components 
– be they countries or economic and political processes – remain immobile and unchanged. 
Fault lines appeared in the world, lately the dramatically changed policy stance of the United 
States following President Trump entry into office. Also fault lines within the European Union 
gained momentum, the most pregnant among these being the unforeseen event of Brexit.
17  “Such imbalances might arise because the process of adjustment and restructuring set in motion by the removal 
of physical, technical and fiscal barriers is unlikely to have an even impact on different regions or always produce 
satisfactory results within reasonable periods of time. Imbalances might also emanate from labour and other cost 
developments, external shocks with differing repercussions on individual economies, or divergent economic policies 
pursued at national level… None the less, such imbalances, if left uncorrected, would manifest themselves as regional 
disequilibria” (Delors Report 1989, p. 15).
18  “Measures designed to strengthen the mobility of factors of production and the flexibility of prices would help to deal 
with such imbalances.” (Delors Report 1989, p. 15).
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6. Conclusions
A consistent and considerable split between vulnerable and resilient countries is perhaps the 
most distinctive feature of the present Eurozone. Although pre-existent, the management 
of the crisis made this division evident and potentially dangerous for the monetary union 
and the individual countries, in particular in a period of unstable financial markets. This 
division is not easily manageable, due to the construction of the Eurozone, the constraints 
this imposes on vulnerable countries and the spillovers to resilient countries through various 
financial and real linkages. In fact, the Eurozone lacks a common government of the economy 
and a full lender of last resort.
This is not to deny that important steps were implemented towards surrogate solutions in 
recent years, which relaxed somewhat the stringent rules and policy stance concerning public 
finances and fostered return to greater financial stability, the ECB move towards a de facto role 
as lender of last resort, the Commission’s European investment plan and a viable coordination 
with the European Council. These improvements helped the present revival of growth in the 
European Union. In spite of these improvements, the impression is that the Eurozone is late 
in responding properly to mounting problems, although the consistent determination of the 
ECB has certainly eased the situation. So far, the Eurozone is chasing problems more than 
anticipating them. In particular, the fundamental reform of the Eurozone, while proceeding, 
continues to be slow compared to the needs. Coupled with the difficulty that vulnerable 
countries continue to meet in implementing the solutions to their problems discussed above, 
in decreasing part to their demerit, the outcome can be problematic for individual vulnerable 
countries and potentially hazardous for the monetary integration.
There are three factors and their interaction to be considered for assessing the present 
situation: a) European awareness and mutual trust; b) fault lines within the Eurozone and 
the European Union; and c) external problems. On the first of these factors, awareness and 
mutual trust, clearly there were improvements. The Eurozone and the EU became more 
pragmatic and better aware of the seriousness of problems. Various signs of a new spirit are 
around: the determination of the ECB; the engagement of vulnerable countries to reform; 
some increasing f lexibility of the European Commission and its greater resolve to support 
growth; some pragmatism by resilient countries. Apparently the time is getting ripe for 
bolder steps towards better policies and a deeper and more complete monetary, economic and 
perhaps political integration. This refers at least to some kind of common government of the 
economy that complements the strengthened position of the ECB; completing the banking 
union, including instruments to support and clean European banks of the sizeable amount 
of non-performing loans, and a capital markets union; a stronger and permanent European 
investment plan; and a more complete common government in other spheres, particularly 
international and military affairs (or at least a more effective coordination of national policies).
The problem is that in an important part of the EU anti-integration national sentiments 
are still strong and there is a drive towards stronger national governments. Fortunately, 
this concerns less the Eurozone, populist parties apart. This leads to the second factor: the 
increasing fault lines within the Eurozone and the European Union. Obviously the most 
important and shocking is Brexit. The EU was clearly surprised and it seems to be in some 
difficulty (Dallago 2016b), although reasonableness seem to take hold. However, the most 
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important question is to see whether Brexit reinforces centrifugal forces in the EU or whether 
it will help consolidating the internal situation. For the time being, the latter seem to prevail. 
The danger of further splits could push the European Commission and national governments 
to prudence, to dilute the integration process. This could be viable for non-euro countries, but 
it is hardly an option for the Eurozone, since it would lead to jeopardize monetary unification. 
This opens a third possibility: a process towards a multi-level Union: a hard central core, the 
Eurozone, which will proceed to strengthen integration, and a softer external ring, in which 
national governments could perhaps slow down the integration. This “third way” would have 
many advantages and has good chances to progress pragmatically.
The third factor, external problems, is growing rapidly beyond expectations and is becoming 
a serious threat for the European integration. While the relations with Russia continue to be 
strained, but can be probably stabilized to mutual advantage, it is the position of the new US 
administration under President Trump, openly adverse to European integration and more 
interested in establishing strong partnership with Great Britain, which may constitute a more 
serious threat to the EU. And the Eurozone is at the center of this political offensive.
While the first factor is positive from the perspective of the Eurozone, the two other 
factors are worrying.19 The problem is to understand how they could interact: the threats 
could strengthen the positive factor and accelerate its progress. However, they could also 
introduce and deepen the differences within the Eurozone. The Eurozone was established as 
an institutionally irreversible accomplishment. Time and events are testing whether it is so 
also in reality.
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Abstract
In this paper we analyse separately the impact of economic and political institutions 
on economic growth in transitional countries. In the first part we examine whether 
and to what extent the economic and political institutions affect the growth rate 
in the observed countries, while in the second part we analyze the economic 
preconditions for development of economic and political institutions in these 
countries. We will show that political, e.g. democratic institutions depend on the 
level of development and initial and inherited conditions. However, they also 
depend upon the growth model of a relevant transitional country, which relies on 
lower share of industry in its GDP, as well as upon greater openness of that economy. 
This leads us to consider: (a) the very method of measuring the development of 
democratic institutions and its validity, since that development model has not 
produced economic growth, and (b) measuring the development of institutions 
related to the growth model that derived from the liberal concept of transition that 
produced that model’s substance and an ideological conception of democracy.
Key words: political and economic institutions, transition, economic growth, initial 
conditions
In transitional countries it is necessary to provide certain economic preconditions for the 
construction of high-quality institutions that would further represent institutional basis 
for future economic growth. We will analyze the separate impact of economic and political 
institutions on economic growth in these countries. In the first part of this paper we will 
examine whether and to what extent the economic and political institutions affect the rate 
of growth in these countries, while in the second part we are going to analyze the economic 
preconditions for development of economic and political institutions in transitional countries.
Prior to the research part, we noted that the transition is a very dynamic process and a kind 
of social experiment, and as such it was the subject of numerous studies. It had been looked 
1  We are very grateful to Professor Bozidar Cerovic and Professor Aleksandra Nojkovic for their helpful suggestions and 
advice. We are also grateful to the anonymous referee for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own.
2  Full time professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University, Director of Institute for Asian Studies, email: 
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3  Teaching associate, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University, Researcher at Institute for Asian Studies, email: 
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for an answer to the question what were the driving political and economic assumptions (or 
rather, force), which directed the transition in the right (or wrong) direction. Eicher et al. 
(2010) emphasized the impact of structural policies4 and the rule of law on the growth rate. 
They found that there was a positive, strong and statistically significant relationship between 
them. Also, according to the OECD standards, increasing the quality of the rule of law, by 10 
percent, leads to annual growth of 2.5 percent. What they called structural policies, other 
authors called public (social) infrastructure,5 economic institutions6, or simply institutions.7 
Common to them was that all these terms were used to point to identical or at least similar 
problems. However, the dynamism of transition coming from the different experiences that 
were the results of different political and economic preconditions was specific for each country 
in transition. Specifically, in this process none of them took a step from the same starting 
position. Hence one could expect different results and inadequacy for most of the transition 
countries to apply the same model of reform. Therefore, the initial institutional conditions 
(political and economic), as numerous studies have shown (De Melo et. al 1996, De Melo et. al 
1997, Monastiriotis et al. 2010), were significant, almost the determining factor of transition 
in those countries. In addition to the initial conditions, as well as other important factors 
that determined the direction and intensity of the transition, empirical researches singled 
out structural reforms together with the associated construction market infrastructure.8 
The aim of all this researches was to identify the most important determinants of economic 
growth, thus the economic recovery in transition countries, and, accordingly, to set up their 
importance.
In this paper, using the unbalanced panel models, we will test the impact of interconnectivity 
institutions on economic growth and development, and vice versa, in transitional countries. 
Here we want to emphasize that we are talking about a preliminary analysis, which “opens 
the door” for further research. Our main intention is to show that economic and political 
institutions are important factors of economic growth and development, but also to show that, 
especially for transitional countries, where institutional changes has been undergoing, it is 
wrong to ignore the importance of inherited preconditions and level of economic development 
of these countries and give precedence only to institutions (primarily political ones). This 
research started with the question: whether a growth model based on liberalization and 
rapid privatization, accompanied by rapid democratization without an adequate political and 
institutional infrastructure had been a good reform transition concept in these countries? 
Had it respected their mutual differences and peculiarities and with what results? 
This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part we analyze the impact of different 
policies expressed through indicators that measure the effects of these policies on economic 
growth, which we connect with some of the institutional indicators of the European Bank 
4  Torsten Persson (2005) dealt with a similar analysis. He showed that it was not enough just to rely on the usual claim 
that good institutions were necessary for economic development, but the analysis must have been deepened with 
the question – what were the social institutions that led to the adoption of certain developmental policies. In that 
context, unlike other authors who used only the term "institution", he used the term "structural policies". 
5 Hall E. R. et al. (1998).
6 Acemoglu D. et al. (2005).
7 Rodrik D. et al. (2002). 
8 Please consult a paper (Mervar A. 2002) that gives an overview of empirical researches on the topic of transition. 
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for Reconstruction and Development, and the Freedom House. We chose indicators of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and development9 because they were used in numerous 
studies dealing with the transition and provided the most comprehensive information relating 
to the success of transition reforms. At first glance between them we can spot those with 
institutional character (e.g. the banking and non-banking sector, restructuring), while some 
of them are part of the construction of the system (privatization, price liberalization), and we 
will keep them in the summary index of reforms. They were used to measure reported success 
in the institutional construction of the market system in the transition countries10, which is 
why we are using them as a proxy for quality of economic institutions in these countries.
On the other hand, most of the analysis of the political reform and democratization process 
in the transition countries relied on Freedom House’s indicators of political and civil liberties,11 
which is why we have decided to use them to display the level of the quality of political 
institutions in these countries. Among the first who decided to have a similar venture were 
Kormendi and Maguire (1985), who on a sample of 47 countries in the period 1950-1977, using 
the Freedom House's indexes of political and civil liberties, as a proxy for economic rights, the 
property rights, as well as enforcing contracts, showed their impact on investment growth 
and, consequently, on economic growth. Exploring the impact of the political infrastructure 
on economic growth in a sample of 113 countries, namely the impact of political repression 
and the lack of political and civil liberties, for the period 1951 – 1980, Grier and Talok (1989) 
used just index of the Freedom House. For our analysis the most important paper is one of 
Barro J.R. (1994) who used indexes of political and civil liberties on a sample of 100 countries, 
in the period from 1960 to 1990, to examine the effects of democracy on economic growth. 
Relying on these papers, we considered that with the indexes of political and civil liberties 
of the Freedom House we could adequately present level of quality of political institutions in 
transitional countries.
Our determination in this research to have some institutional indicators arose from the 
idea to use them to show the f low and quality of institution-building in these countries and 
its impact on economic growth. However, in the second part of this paper we point to the 
conditionality of building quality institution with a level of economic development of the 
observed countries.
9  In the beginning we followed eight indicators, which covered three main areas of transition: a) companies (privatization 
on a large and small scale, restructuring), b) market and trade (pricing liberalization, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition), c) financial institutions (banking and non-banking sector and its reform). We later added another 
field on which we observed the progress in transition, and that is the infrastructure (overall infrastructure reform). The 
progress in transition in the given countries is measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 means almost no or little progress 
in reforms, while 4 indicates major progress in transition. Later the system of evaluation of progress in transition is 
expanded with marks + and – in order to obtain more precise results (numerical +/- 0.33).
10  List of these countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
11  The methodology of the Freedom House indicators shows a level of political and economic liberties on a scale of 1 to 
7, in the following manner: 1 expresses the country with the highest level of liberty, while 7 expresses the least free 
countries, or countries with extremely authoritarian political regimes.
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Economic growth in transition countries – the impact of economic and political 
institutions
Economic reforms in transitional countries have opened a number of questions, especially 
regarding the policy of economic growth while significant deficiencies, some of which 
institutional, were noticed. The current global economic crisis in these countries further 
pointed at institutional weaknesses, which was why transitional reforms couldn’t have better 
results, and in some cases, reforms have been even counterproductive. Economic development 
that based primarily on a high degree of liberalization and rapid privatization, which was 
suggested to the majority of transition countries, neglected the issue of institutional economic 
structures in these countries. Besides, the absence of industrial policy and developmental 
strategy in these countries proved particularly destructive especially expressed during the 
current global economic crisis (Cerovic et al. 2013).
The dilemma that now again occupies the scientific and professional community dealing 
with this issue is how to propel economic growth in transition countries. Which are the 
economic, and which are the institutional preconditions? In our empirical analysis, we 
assume that the stability and quality of economic and political institutions is an important 
precondition for economic growth in these countries.
The study was based on unbalanced panel models, in which the annual growth rate in 
transitional countries (GRWR) is a dependent variable (EBRD data), while the explanatory 
(independent) variables are: inflation rate (EBRD data) lagged for a year (in log terms) 
(LOG_INF (-1)), the impact of initial conditions over time (INC * TR), which represent some 
of the initial conditions to reflect macroeconomic distortions and the level of development of 
market processes (taken from De Melo et al. 1994, 1997), economic openness (import + export, 
share of GDP (EBRD data) (OPN), the level of government expenditure (GEXP), measured as 
a share of GDP (EBRD data). These indicators represent macroeconomic variables related to 
the economic policy, and also we are adding to them the average of nine EBRD indicators of 
progress in transition which, to a large extent, have the institutional character and are used 
to show progress in structural and institutional economic reforms in the observed countries 
lagged for a year (in log terms). Shortly, this independent variable can also be called the 
index of EBRD reforms (EBRDIN(-1). The panel model was rated on a sample of 25 transition 
countries during the period from 1990 to 2007, which we have defined as a period without 
major economic disruptions on a global level. Hence, the observed period is until the current 
global economic crisis.
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Table 1. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic variables  
and economic institutions on the growth rate (GRWR) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variables Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
LOG_INF(-1) -2.901911*** -6.317154 0.0000
INC*TR 4.32E-05*** 3.230137 0.0013
OPN -0.020862** -2.162856 0.0312
GEXP -0.200080*** -7.358180 0.0000
EBRDIN(-1) 2.205566*** 3.316126 0.0010
C 7.560289 3.428231 0.0007
R2 0.452598
Adjusted R2 0.445396
F – statistic 62.83773 0.00000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel 
observations 386
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
Taking into account the results presented in Table 1, we conclude that five used independent 
variables explain about 45% changes in the growth rate (adjusted R2). All explanatory variables 
are statistically important for different levels of significance. If we look at the rate of inflation 
and the level of government spending, we can see that reducing them (negative sign with 
appropriate coefficients) leads to increasing growth rates, which is expected. In transitional 
countries, we should expect that over time the high rates of inflation and high levels of 
government expenditure will reduce, which are accompanied the initial stages of reform, in 
order to establish a stable macroeconomic environment, which confirms its importance as a 
positive and important growth factor12. Initial conditions are positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, which means that they are an important factor of economic growth in 
transitional countries for a long period of time (in this case 18 years). On the other hand, a 
negative sign in front of the coefficient of the independent variable openness of the economy, 
which is statistically significant, shows that faster and higher growth has been achieved 
by transition countries which have opted for a slightly closed market economic model as 
were not too hasty when it came to opening of the economy. In their research, Cerovic and 
Nojkovic (2013) showed that transitional countries with less opened market economy were 
more export-oriented, while the increase of openness was usually manifested through the 
growth of imports. The explanatory variable EBRD’s index of reforms is positively correlated 
with the dependent variable and also statistically significant, which suggests that the start 
12 Similar results can be found in: Fischer S. et. al (1996). 
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of economic reforms in transition must be followed by the construction of stable economic 
institutions. 
Given the fact that in this part of the paper, we assume that the institutional environment is 
an important factor of economic growth and development, especially for transition countries 
in which institutional changes take place, we will replace existing independent variable used 
to measure success in conducting economic reforms, with another, that otherwise shows the 
institutional environment. We opted for indicators of civil liberties and political rights of the 
Freedom House, which shows, in general terms, the level of democracy, and consequently, 
the level of development of political and economic institutions (which rules apply) in these 
countries. We looked specifically for the indicators of political rights, then civil liberties, as 
well as their average, to evaluate their possible impact on economic growth.
In the next model we evaluate the same dependant variable – the rate of growth in transition 
countries (GRWR), and regarding to independent variables we are holding back the inflation 
rate lagged for a year (in log terms) (LOG_INF (-1)), the effect of initial conditions over time 
(INC * TR), which are defined in the same manner as in the previous model, as well as the 
level of government expenditure (GEXP), measured as a share in GDP. We are adding a new 
explanatory variable, and that is the level of realization of political rights (Freedom House 
data) in transition countries (POLR (-1)), according to the reports of the Freedom House, 
lagged for a year. Analysis of this model also covers 25 countries that were in transition during 
the period of 18 years (1990-2007).
Table 2. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic variables and the level of realization of 
political rights on the growth rate (GRWR) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t- statistic Probabilities
LOG_INF(-1) -3.304837*** -7.301324 0.0000
INC*TR 8.58E-05*** 7.566191 0.0000
GEXP -0.160001*** -5.473877 0.0000
POLR(-1) 0.332437* 1.654160 0.0989
C 6.712844 3.503091 0.0005
R2 0.412284
Adjusted R2 0.406287
F – statistic 68.74729 0.00000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel 
observations 397
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
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Four independent indicators explain a little more than 40% (adjusted R2) of the impact of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable (growth rate). All explanatory variables can 
be considered statistically significant and have different levels of significance. The coefficients 
of the two independent variables – inflation rate and government spending – have a negative 
sign, which suggests that a lower inflation rate and a lower government spending have a 
positive impact on the growth rate, and that is a result that is consistent with the previous 
model. In this model, it can also be seen that the influence of initial conditions on the growth 
rate is maintained over time. However, the coefficient of the independent institutional 
variable that expresses the level of realization of political rights in countries in transition, that 
is statistically significant, have a positive sign, which is why it can be concluded that those 
countries with less political liberty achieved higher growth rates (this conclusion comes from 
the fact that lower levels of political liberty are expressed with higher values of indicators of 
the Freedom House).
At first glance, this result, although econometrically correct, seems economically unfounded 
and irrational. This is why, in the next model, we replaced the independent variable, used for 
measuring the level of realization of political rights, with the level of civil liberties in these 
countries lagged for a year (CIVL (-1)), also measured by the Freedom House.
Table 3. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic variables and the level of civil liberties on 
the growth rate (GRWR) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probabilities
LOG_INF(-1) -3.381904*** -7.455943 0.0000
INC*TR 8.86E-05*** 7.799550 0.0000
GEXP -0.152095*** -5.132420 0.0000
CIVL(-1) 0.589399* 2.286744 0.0227
C 5.402618 2.601248 0.0096
2R 0.416242
Adjusted 
2R 0.410286
F – statistic 69.87785 0.00000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel 
observations 397
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
As we can see, the results are similar to the previous model. Selected independent indicators 
explain a little more than 41% (adjusted R2) the impact of independent variables on the 
dependent variable (rate of growth). All explanatory variables can be considered statistically 
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significant for those different levels of significance. However, there is still a correlation 
between lower level of civil liberties and higher growth rates.
Because of now observed regularities in the results obtained in the previous two models, 
in the next model we replaced an independent variable used to measure the degree of civil 
liberties in the countries in transition, with the average of indicators of civil liberties and 
political rights in these countries, also expressed according to the methodology of the 
Freedom House (FHAV (-1)), lagged for a year. We have evaluated the same dependant variable 
– the growth rate (GRWR) in transition countries, and regarding to independent variables 
we were holding back the inflation rate lagged for a year (LOG_INF (-1)), the effect of initial 
conditions over time (INC * TR), which were defined in the same manner as in the previous 
model, as well as the level of government expenditure (GEXP), measured as a share in GDP. 
Table 4. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic variables and political institutions (average 
indicators Freedom House) on the growth rate (GRWR) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probabilities
LOG_INF(-1) -3.341403*** -7.378685 0.0000
INC*TR 8.74E-05*** 7.684451 0.0000
GEXP -0.155288*** -5.261072 0.0000
FHAV(-1) 0.461757* 1.986640 0.0477
C 6.020746 2.993777 0.0029
R2 0.414173
Adjusted R2 0.408195
F – statistic 69.28487 0.00000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel 
observations 397
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
As we expected, the results were very close to the results of the previous two models. 
Four independent indicators explained a little less than 41% (adjusted R2) the influence of 
independent variables on the dependent variable (growth rate). All explanatory variables 
could be considered statistically significant for those different levels of significance. The 
odds of two independent variables – inflation rate and government spending – had a negative 
character, which we already explained as a connection of lower inflation and lower government 
spending with a higher growth rate. The influence of the initial conditions also remained 
highly significant. In this model there was a positive correlation between the independent 
variable which was used to measure the degree of civil liberties and political rights and the 
dependent variable. Although our result in this model, as in the previous two, led us to the 
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conclusion that the weaker institutional environment, i.e. lower level of democracy in the 
transition countries was a precondition of their rapid economic development, we believed that 
that result still pointed to the others, very important economic preconditions of institutional 
transformation in these countries, which would be the focus of the second part of this paper.
The importance of economic institutions had often been neglected in a transitional process 
as it was expected that the market itself would be able to achieve optimal solutions. Such an 
approach to transitional reforms proved incomplete and probably wrong, despite the fact that 
changes were necessary and the direction of changes was correct. That is why the insistence 
on introducing reforms such as privatization, liberalization, and political institutions in these 
countries that were compatible with the political institutions in developed market economies, 
which have the centuries-long tradition of institutional heritage, could not give good results, 
because they were not in the process of creating transitioning recipes of a certain respected 
institutional arrangement (level of general and political culture and tradition, i.e. the existing 
informal institutions that prevent the "import" of any formal institution, then the stability of 
the political institutions, etc.) and economic preconditions (level of economic development of 
a certain country at the moment reforms began) in transitional countries.
The relevant authors (Rodrik D. 2008) in the series of studies point out that – although 
institutional "rigidity" is a reasonable option for the countries in transition looking for “quick 
solution” in the lack of time, especially if one takes into account the fact that there is no unique 
set of the best solutions applicable to all countries at all times – there has to be taken into 
account that institutional conditions are specific to each country as well. On the other hand, 
there are studies (Raimbaev A. 2011) that indicate the smaller importance of institutions on 
economic performance in transitional countries and explain the fact that these countries are 
in the process of building and development of market institutions. If these institutions do not 
have the potential to affect the business environment, then the transactions in the market will 
be managed by so-called "informal institutions", which are changing very slowly over time 
and which impact on economic growth is not easily measurable.
So, starting from these assumptions, in the second part of this paper we will try to find 
answers to the questions: why the institution-building process in transition countries is slow 
and often ineffective, and why the results in previous models suggest to us that political 
institutions have a negative impact on economic growth in these countries.
The economic predetermination of institutional development in countries in 
transition
Among many empirical studies (Arsic M. et al. 2016) where it was confirmed that a greater 
impact on economic growth had economic, rather than political institutions, in which the 
effect was often negative and non-linear, we wanted to single out the paper of Robert J. Barro 
(1994) which had explored the relationship between economic growth and democracy in a 
sample of 100 countries in the period from 1960 to 1990. He came to the conclusion that there 
was a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth in which the low level 
of political freedoms encouraged economic growth, while, on the other hand, it was slowing 
as the country  were progressing with the development of political freedoms (democracy). 
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His analysis showed that a better standard of living, measured by the value of GDP per 
capita, as well as better education, encouraged the development of political institutions, 
which were becoming more democratic over time. The main conclusion of his work was that 
“the developed Western economies”, would far more help developing and underdeveloped 
countries if they "exported" their economic institutions (especially property rights and some 
of the mechanisms of the free market), instead of imposing their political institutions upon 
them, which had arisen as a result of improved living standards. The establishment of stable 
economic institutions in underdeveloped and developing countries promote economic 
growth and those countries will eventually be more democratic. In the long term, this method 
of implementation of economic institutions of the developed economies would have a better 
effect on growth and spread of democracy.
Guided by his conclusions, in subsequent models, we will explore the economic propositions 
for development of political institutions in transition countries. Unlike previous models, in 
which we tested the effect of some macroeconomic, as well as some institutional variables 
on economic growth in these countries, in this part of our paper we will try to answer the 
previously mentioned questions about the economic preconditions of successful institutional 
reforms in transitional countries.
Thus, the dependent variable will be certain institutional variable and explanatory 
or independent variable will be certain macroeconomic indicators, which are related to 
economic growth and development in these countries. Specifically, for the institutional 
dependent variable in this model, we determine the quality of certain economic institutions 
in transition countries, which we defined as an average of nine indicators EBRD progress 
in transition which have institutional character, or shorter, EBRD reform index (EBRDIN)13. 
With these indicators we show the progress in structural and institutional economic reforms 
in transition countries. Independent or explanatory variables are the level of development, 
expressed by the value of GDP per capita (i.e. GDPPC (-1)) lagged for a year (EBRD data), the 
openness of the economy (imports + exports, the share of GDP) (OPN (-1)) also lagged for a 
year, the share of industry in GDP (EBRD data) as an indicator of economic structure (IND)14, 
inflation rate lagged for a year (LOG_INF (-1)), as well as the level of government expenditure 
(GEXP), measured as a share of GDP. 
13 This variable is defined as in Table 1.
14  We decided for this variable, because it is, in addition to the trade balance, all the more notable as a decisive element 
of the "new growth model" in transition countries. More information: Cerovic B. et al. (2013). 
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Table 5. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic indicators on the quality of economic 
institutions (EBRDIN) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
GDPPC(-1) 5.03E-05*** 7.105421 0.0000
OPN(-1) 0.001895*** 3.366688 0.0008
IND -0.015479*** -5.550656 0.0000
LOG_INF(-1) -0.254356*** -11.97893 0.0000
GEXP -0.012760*** -5.870854 0.0000
C 3.641996 28.86170 0.0000
R2 0.550989
Adjusted R2 0.544647
F – statistic 86.87998 0.00000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel observations 360
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**) i 10% (*).
All explanatory variables are statistically significant. Five independent variables explain a little 
more than 54% (adjusted R2) of the impact on the dependent variable (index of reforms EBRD). 
There is a positive relationship between the independent variables – the level of development 
and openness of the economy, with the dependent variable, which points to conclusion that a 
higher level of development, as well as a more open market economy, have a positive impact 
and encourage the development of economic institutions in transition countries, which is in 
line with the results of the previously mentioned Barro’s paper. A negative sign in front of the 
coefficients of the variables of inflation and government spending, which in previous models 
indicated that lower levels of these variables encouraged growth, should now be understood 
as that through the growth rate these variables had a positive impact on the development 
of economic institutions, i.e. on economic reforms in these countries. That result could be 
explained by economic and structural adjustments which were meant to reduce the impact 
of the industry on the economic growth in these countries, especially if one took into account 
the fact that till the beginning of the transition, i.e. until 1989, the industrial sector in these 
countries was dominant and also, according to some estimates, over-industrialized (De Melo 
et al. 1996), and therefore it was not surprising that the reduction in the industry had a positive 
effect on the economic reforms in the early stages. However, problems occurred later when it 
went over the expected level (Cerovic et al. 2014).
In the initial stages of the transition in most post-socialist countries the impact of the 
industrial policy has been neglected, while the priority components of the economic policy 
were liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Washington Consensus. However, in the early 2000s, the situation 
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started to change, so the industrial policy ranked among important policies of transition,15 
which was partly caused by the process of accession of ten new countries16 into the European 
Union. After the outbreak of the current global economic crisis, industrial policy became a 
central policy of the strategy of the European Union in its efforts to remain a global economic 
leader (Cerovic et al. 2014). We concluded that economic reforms such as liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization and privatization could not be substitutes for an industrial 
policy, or a specific developmental strategy neither for given country in transition, but 
precisely the opposite: in a long term, these economic reforms could not support the economic 
growth if reforms were not also consisted of the appropriate industrial or development policy, 
which favors production and export, in correspondence with the inherited institutional 
conditions of a given transition country. Cerovic and Nojkovic, in one of their studies (2013), 
used the empirical analysis to show that in the period of crisis, i.e. during the first years of 
recovery, export-oriented policy was essential for transition countries.
Taking into account that we indicated in the model, Table 5, a positive relationship between 
the levels of economic development of transition countries and economic reforms, i.e. building 
their economic institutions, below we will examine the economic assumptions of the reforms of 
political institutions in these countries, starting from the previously imposed postulation that 
stable economic institutions must be the basis for building stable political institutions, and that 
together they represent an institutional basis for economic growth in these countries.
Hence, starting from the aforementioned conclusions of Robert Barro, in the following 
models we will examine the impact of levels of development and initial conditions, as well as 
some factors that influence the growth of GDP in transitional countries on the development 
of their political institutions. We assume that the level of development of political institutions 
in these countries, as well as their quality, is directly related to the initial, i.e. inherited 
conditions. This assumption is based on a number of studies in which is demonstrated that 
the rate of reforms, progress in transition, the economic performance of transition countries, 
as well as their institutional development, largely depend on the initial conditions17. We also 
want to examine how the model of growth in these countries – which until the advent of the 
15  The European Union in Lisbon in 2000 adopted a document known as the "Lisbon Strategy", aiming to EU by 2010 
become the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. The realization of the set goals did not take place 
at the desirable pace, partly due to the deteriorating global economic situation, which was why the redefinition 
of the set goals started. This process resulted in the creation of a new strategic document entitled "Europe 2020: 
a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth". This document clearly separated three priority areas: smart 
growth (developing an economy based on knowledge), sustainable growth (while encouraging competitiveness and 
production that efficiently treats resources) and inclusive growth (better participation in the labor market, the fight 
against poverty and social cohesion). All three areas were covered by the relevant initiatives. Within the framework 
of sustainable growth, we particularly point to the importance of the initiative entitled "An industrial policy for the 
globalization era", which supports the development of strong and sustainable industrial base competitive on a global 
level. For more information: Kronja et al. (2011). 
16  In 2004 the European Union was expanded with ten new members: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, which represents the largest number of countries that have been 
admitted to the EU at once.
17  Looking at the transitional reforms as an endogenous process, in a large number of papers it's shown that the initial 
conditions, although ignored by the proponents of rapid transition (see e.g. Sachs J.D. (1996)), had defining influence 
on the direction and outcome of transitional reforms (see: Cerovic et al. (2008); Cerovic B. (2010); Falcetti et al. (2002); 
Campos et al. (2002)).
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current economic crisis (2008) was based on an import-oriented growing demand (which 
increase was relying on the inflow of foreign assets), followed by de-industrialization and in 
favor of growth of the service sector18 – has affected construction of their political institutions.
In Table 6 the results of model evaluation, in which the dependent variable is presented 
as the average of indicators of civil liberties and political rights in transition countries that 
demonstrates the quality of political institutions, measured according to the methodology of 
the Freedom House (FHAV) are shown (Freedom House data). Independent, i.e. explanatory 
variables are the level of development, expressed through the value of GDP per capita (i.e. 
GDPPC (-1)), lagged for a year, the initial conditions (INC) (taken from De Melo et al. 1994, 1997), 
the share of import (EBRD data) in GDP (IMP), the share of industry in GDP (IND), as well as 
the level of government expenditure (GEXP), measured as a share of GDP. Here we have also 
used an unbalanced panel model. By modeling we included 25 countries in transition in the 
period of 18 years (1990 – 2007). During this period there were no major economic disruptions.
Table 6. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic indicators on the quality of political 
institutions (FHAV) in transitional countries (1990-2007)
Variables Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
GDPPC(-1) -6.57E-05*** -5.622700 0.0000
INC -0.000425*** -3.262759 0.0012
IMP -0.006125** -2.554838 0.0110
IND 0.026927*** 5.013097 0.0000
GEXP 0.000747 0.176373 0.8601
C 5.586533 7.102891 0.0000
R2 0.187490
Adjusted R2 0.176390
F – statistic 16.89117 0.000000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel 
observations 372
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
All explanatory variables, except the level of government expenditure, are statistically 
significant, with a certain degree of error. It explained about 17% of the impact of selected 
independent variables on the changes in the level of institutional development in transitional 
18  Until the outbreak of the current economic crisis (2008) GDP growth in countries in transition relied on a model of 
a import driven demand and de-industrialization, and in favor of the growth of the service sector. See: Cerovic et al. 
(2015); Cerovic B. (2015a).
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countries (adjusted R2). The independent explanatory variable – the level of development is 
significant and negatively associated with the dependent variable. This means that a higher 
level of development (higher value of GDP per capita, i.e. a better standard of living), encourages 
the construction and development of quality and stable political institutions (it is expressed 
with a negative sign taking into account the methodology of measuring the level of quality of 
political institutions of the Freedom House, which was previously discussed). Initial conditions 
also significantly influenced the dependent variable, suggesting that the initial conditions 
predetermine the quality level of democratic political institutions. In addition, the greater value 
of imports (reliance on import encouraged demand) and deindustrialization which marked the 
model of growth in transitional countries – showed in the model as a lower share of industry 
in GDP – contributed to the improvement of political institutions and statistically significantly 
affected the dependent variable. This means that a lower share of industry in GDP causes the 
formation of quality political institutions. This result will be more explained below. The level of 
government spending, as the results show, is not statistically significant, although the character 
before the coefficient agrees with the assumption that the reduction in government spending 
leads to improvement of political institutions in these countries.
Since we have showed in the previous model that, in addition to the level of development, 
initial or inherited conditions had defining influence on the direction and quality of 
transitional reforms, in the next model we want to examine their importance over time 
and more specifically, whether their importance over time decreases or not. The dependent 
variable and all the independent variables are defined in the same way as in Table 6, while an 
independent variable, initial conditions, are multiplied with the trend to evaluate whether 
their impact on the quality of the reform of political institutions in transition countries 
decreases over time, or not.
Table 7. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic indicators on the quality of political 
institutions (FHAV) in transitional countries (1990-2007) 
Variables Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
GDPPC(-1) -9.70E-05*** -5.244192 0.0000
INC*TR 3.38E-06* 1.888085 0.0598
IMP -0.006365*** -2.665202 0.0080
IND 0.027133*** 5.063770 0.0000
GEXP 0.002389 0.534192 0.5935
C 3.052431 8.322013 0.0000
R2 0.171897
Adjusted R2 0.160584
F – statistic 15.19475 0.000000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel observations 372
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
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The results confirmed some of the conclusions obtained in the previous model. All explanatory 
variables, except the level of government expenditure, proved statistically significant, with a 
certain degree of error. It explained about 16% of the impact of selected independent variables 
on the level of institutional development in transition countries (adjusted R2). Even in this 
model the results showed that the higher level of development was an economic precondition 
of construction and development of quality and stable political, i.e. democratic institutions. 
Initial conditions remained important, but with reducing impact.19 The independent variable 
that showed share of industry in GDP was also significant and positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, meaning that the lower share of industry in GDP was a condition for 
construction of quality political institutions.
However, in the previous analysis, substantiated with other studies with similar results, we 
have shown that the importance of the industry in the overall economic reforms was neglected, 
given the fact that most countries in transition had too big industrial sector in the pre-
transition period. But, despite the initial structural adjustments that were intended to reduce 
the industrial sector in these countries, we found very similar results in models in which we 
had examined the impact of the share of industry in GDP on the development of economic 
and political institutions in these countries, expressed through index EBRD and scale of the 
Freedom House, and it could be understood as another, first of all, a methodological problem. 
In fact, both the indicators contained a certain degree of subjective assessment, most likely 
coming from the impact of the same ideological base, a neo-liberal doctrine that excludes the 
importance of industry and industrial policy in general for the development of transitional 
countries. This approach can lead to better grades for institutional development only in those 
economies which are more close to the neo-liberal model. That is why only one concept of 
reforms, which is imposed on all economies, regardless of their inherited conditions or level 
of development, has proved as incomplete and often wrong.20
We continued deepening the analysis by making the next model to examine the effects 
of economic openness on the construction and development of political institutions in 
transitional countries. The reason why we opted for this variable was the openness of the 
economy as one of the most recommended policies for transitional countries and as such 
a more general factor than imports (external influence on domestic institutions through a 
spillover effect, or the effect of emulation). So, the dependent variable remained the same – 
the average of indicators of civil liberties and political rights in transition countries, showing 
the quality of political institutions, measured according to the methodology of the Freedom 
House (FHAV). Independent, i.e. explanatory variables, were the level of development 
expressed through the value of GDP per capita (i.e. GDPPC (-1)), lagged for a year, the initial 
conditions (INC) as defined in Table 6, share of industry in GDP (IND), as well as the openness 
of the economy (import + export, the share of GDP) (OPN). 
19  Cerovic and Nojkovic (2008) obtained similar results, which showed that the initial conditions had a lasting and 
significant impact on progress in transitional reforms. According to their findings, the impact of economic and 
institutional heritage lasts much longer than anticipated at the beginning of the transition. 
20  Similar critics can be found in: Campos et al. (2006); Babetskii et al. (2007); Hoskisson et al. (2000).
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Table 8. Evaluation of the effects of certain macroeconomic indicators on the quality of political 
institutions (FHAV) in transition countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
GDPPC(-1) -7.44E-05*** -6.450683 0.0000
INC -0.000429*** -3.567680 0.0004
IND 0.037945*** 7.147822 0.0000
OPN -0.002837*** -2.471210 0.0139
C 5.357092 7.383226 0.0000
R2 0.232410
Adjusted R2 0.224372
F – statistic 28.91537 0.000000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel observations 387
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
All explanatory variables were statistically significant. A little more than 22% of the impact 
of selected independent variables on the level of institutional development in transition 
countries (adjusted R2) was explained. The results of this model also showed that the level 
of development, as well as the initial conditions significantly affected quality of political 
institutions in those countries. Also, the independent variable, an openness of the economy, 
as the recommended policy for these countries, proved statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable, meaning that more open market economy was a 
stimulating economic framework for the reform of political institutions in transitional 
countries. Given these results, which indicates the justifiability of recommendations to these 
countries to aim at opening up their economies, especially from the point of institution 
building,21 in the following model we examine whether the effect of initial conditions 
combined with the policy of increasing openness of the economies of these countries over 
time increases or not.
We evaluated the dependent variable as average of indicators of civil liberties and political 
rights in transition countries to show the quality of political institutions (Freedom House 
data), measured according to the methodology of the Freedom House, (FHAV). Independent, 
i.e. explanatory variables, were the level of development (GDPPC (-1)), lagged for a year the 
initial conditions as defined in Table 7 (INC * TR), the share of industry in GDP (IND) and 
openness (imports + exports, the share of GDP) (OPN). 
21  Admittedly, in this case, as well as in the results for the industry, we should retain a certain degree of caution 
considering the assessments of institutional development are based on subjective estimates, and can be understood 
as an agreement or disagreement with some elements of transitional policies, based on ideological preconceptions.
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Table 9. Evaluation of effects of certain macroeconomic indicators on the quality of political institutions 
(FHAV) in transitional countries (1990-2007)
Variable Coefficient t – statistic Probabilities
GDPPC(-1) -9.20E-05*** -4.765469 0.0000
INC*TR 1.54E-06 0.892058 0.3729
IND 0.038003*** 7.071835 0.0000
OPN -0.002937** -2.557375 0.0109
C 2.928581 9.472235 0.0000
R2 0.208903
Adjusted R2 0.200619
F – statistic 25.21842 0.000000
N=25; T=18
Total number of panel observations 387
Note: levels of significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
As could be seen, all explanatory variables, except initial conditions, and their impact over 
time were statistically significant, with a certain degree of error. It explained about 20% of 
the impact of selected independent variables on the level of institutional development in 
transition countries (adjusted R2). This model also showed that a higher level of development, 
as well as more open market economy had a positive impact on the political institutions’ 
reforms in these countries. However, an independent variable showing the influence of initial 
conditions over time on these reforms was not statistically significant. This leads us to the 
conclusion that the initial conditions lose their importance over time while their effect on the 
development of political institutions is being replaced by economic development, structural 
changes (increase in the share of industry in GDP) and especially by the spillover effects and 
emulation effects coming from outside influences that, due to the increasing openness of the 
transition economies has been transmitting to their institutions.
In any case, based on the aforementioned model, we conclude that the political (more 
exactly, democratic) institutions depend on the level of development and inherited conditions. 
However, they also depend on the development or growth model of transitional countries – 
relied on a smaller share of industry in GDP – as well as on a greater openness of the economy 
(primarily import oriented). This leads us towards two possible conclusions: (a) the validity of 
the very method of measuring the development of democratic institutions since in the long 
run this development model did not lead to growth (and thus nor to the growth of GDP per 
capita as a factor of quality of institutions) and (b) the very measuring of the development of 
institutions which was neglected in the model of growth that came from the liberal concept of 
transition led us to conclusion that the model itself was burdened with the ideologically based 
understanding of democracy and the Washington Consensus as equal. 
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Interest for measuring the democratic capacity and the quality of political institutions is not 
completely new.22 It becomes especially important at the end of the Cold War, when the United 
States straight away assumed the global leadership position. And almost immediately, as part 
of triumphalist doctrine, there were proposed packages of political and economic reforms 
that had to be implemented in order to political and economic transformation of transitional 
countries and along, methodological foundation of indicators which were used for such 
purpose attracted more attention of scientists and experts (Hartman et al. 1988; Steiner D.N. 
2012). However, various deficiencies had been observed, primarily methodological. Most of 
them did not dedicate too much attention to political and ideological issues that can be found 
in the background of constructing and the structure of these indicators, which have influence 
on the order, as well as the regularity of the received assessments. Among many studies, 
our attention was attracted to an analysis (Giannone D. 2010) in which the emphasis was 
on these issues. Our interest was further reinforced by the fact that that study analyzed the 
methodological merits of indicators of the Freedom House, which we used in our research.23 
The analysis in this study assumed that the neo-liberal doctrine had significant impact 
on creation of indicators of the Freedom House. From one side, indicators were formed to 
provide a solid knowledge and information about the state of democracy, but there were 
also noticeable political and ideological motives of their occurrence, especially in the early 
1970s, when the concept of neo-liberalism was developed in the leading Western countries, 
in order to strengthen their power in international relations. The results obtained in this 
analysis suggested that, besides pronounced political and ideological motives, FH data did 
not constitute an unbeatable and politically neutral time series, so that their use in research, 
as well as recommendations for various policies, was questionable. Hence the results obtained 
in our models can be received with certain amount of reserve. We assume that there is no a 
universal form of democracy, and that it would be wrong to attempt to impose such concept 
in transitional countries, especially because this concept does not take into account the 
importance of the inherited and different institutional conditions, which we proved to be very 
important for the outcome of political and economic reforms.
Another implication concerns the model of growth that was recommended to transition 
countries that comes from the liberal concept of transition. Immediately after the fall of 
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the dominant form of transition 
into a market economy was established. This form was based on a package of fundamental 
reforms that were intended to lead command economies to a new path of commercialization 
and economic development. The concept of structural reforms was relying on three pillars – 
stabilization, liberalization and privatization, which the international financial institutions 
(WB, IMF, and EBRD) have signed over to Third World countries at the beginning of the 
1980s (Mitrovic D.  2008). This neo-liberal concept rested on the idea of the market as a 
meta-institution of social changes and contained the universal (general) understanding 
of institutional changes. But, this package of economic reforms, covered by the neo-liberal 
22  For example, Freedom House is a non-governmental organization established by the US government in October 
1941, with the goal to investigate and advocate for the process of democracy, political liberties and human rights.
23  Our commitment to use indicators of the Freedom House stems from the fact that today they are the most common 
indicators used in studies, which show a level of democracy, and therefore the quality of political institutions.
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paradigm, was under strong political influence. This was best illustrated by the fact that 
in the period from January 1990 to April 1995, 24 countries in transition have consistently 
applied this concept of reforms (Muller et al. 2011). Pro-market ideas became instruments of 
policies recommended by leading international financial institutions. In the early 1990s, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and newly established European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have coordinated their positions in the form 
of a standard neo-liberal package that governments in post-socialist countries had to accept 
so that they could be granted loans by those institutions. Governments were told that they 
had no choice but to accept this package of measures, based on a Washington Consensus. 
The main argument was that all measures had to be implemented into a package, and that a 
failure in one area would lead to a reduction of the success in other areas (Rutland P. 2013). 
Some proponents (Griffith B. 2006) of this concept of reforms went a step further and talked 
about its paradox, which was that if it was not implemented consistently, that would lead to 
a deepening of political and economic instability. The collapse of socialist political systems 
resulted in an ideological vacuum, and as such, represented a fertile ground for launching 
and development of ideas about the superiority of the market and liberalism.
The questions from which we went into this research concerned the role of institutions in 
fostering the growth as well as growth models in transitional countries, i.e. institutional and 
economic preconditions on which their growth model was based. The process of institution-
building, i.e. institutional reforms in these countries turned out to be slow and often ineffective 
one. The results coming from the evaluation of the models indicate that in these countries 
stable institutions can not arise by themselves, because appropriate economic preconditions 
must be satisfied, while institutional building must be supported by economic development.
Assessing the effects of the transitional process, we can not neglect the fact that since the 
beginning of this process more than two decades past, and that only 11 of the 27 countries 
that were commonly observed and monitored managed to achieve an average growth rate 
of GDP of two or more percent during the period from 1989 to 2008, i.e. until the beginning 
of the global economic and financial crisis. Among these 11 countries, only four economies, 
according to the EBRD, have well advanced in terms of transitional reforms, while the other 
seven are close to or even well below average (Cerovic B. 2015). These results show that the 
transitional process can hardly be evaluated as successful.
Numerous studies, and we have mentioned some of them in the previous paragraphs, have 
dealt with the factors that affected the efficiency in achieving the transition reforms. Some 
authors (Fidrmuc J. 2001) pointed at the interactive relationship between the growth, economic 
liberalization and democratization during the transition, with conclusion that liberalization 
had a strong and positive impact on growth, that democracy facilitated the process of 
economic liberalization and that because of its impact on liberalization, democracy had a 
positive overall effect on growth. However, progress in democratization largely depended on 
the economic performances of countries in transition, but also on the political factors that 
led to the formation of different forms of democracy in them. Some studies (Persson T. 2005) 
have gone a step further by analyzing what forms of democracy, i.e. of the political system, 
were the best promoters of the growth in the long term. It was concluded that the formation 
of parliamentary system compared to a presidential one, and proportional system compared 
to majority voting system, as well as constant democracy compared to the current democracy, 
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were essential political preconditions for the promotion of policies that favored long term 
growth.
The transition is at the same time a change of economic structures and institutions, and 
its final outcome crucially depends on the connection of economic reforms in terms of 
liberalization, macroeconomic policy and institutional development. However, poor results 
in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the former Soviet Union space, 
indicate a lack of compliance in reformed strategies. Pointing out the positive aspects of 
reforms in China, Campos and Coricelli (2002) draw special attention to the importance of 
initial, i.e. inherited conditions. Good results of certain segments of transition in China draw 
attention to the importance of inherited conditions and send the most important message of 
the first ten years of transition, and that is that the reform strategies and recommendations 
should not ignore and negate the existing different institutional structures. Other authors 
(Heybey et al. 1999) go even further in emphasizing the importance of initial, i.e. inherited 
conditions, and claim that the recognition of initial conditions is far more important than the 
political reforms as a determinant of growth.
Neglecting of the inherited conditions and disregard for the existing institutional structure, 
i.e. the tendency to take the same model of institutional reforms and apply it to all transition 
countries represented one of the shortcomings of the transitional concept. Another equally 
important fault of this concept concerns the growth model that was recommended to these 
countries. Namely, the concept of transitional reforms did not predict specific measures 
that would have reflected the growth and development of their specific economies. Basic 
recommendations to these countries were based on the rate of reforms and liberalization 
without a detailed consideration of other measures and policies that could have positive 
effects on the economic performances of their relevant economies. Furthermore, some of 
these policies, among which we singled out the industrial policy, were even seen as a departure 
from the reforms (Cerovic B. 2015).
The current global economic and financial crisis has pointed to some shortcomings and 
deficiencies of the transitional process. The interest in these issues started to grow more and 
more as a result of numerous studies that emerged, which focused primarily on industrial 
policy (Rodrik D. 2008) and its importance and role in the future development of countries 
in transition. Chang (2009) pointed at the importance of industrial policy as an export 
growth promoter. He believes that export is one of the most important indicators of economic 
performances of the given country and that without good export performances economic 
development is not possible. Calling himself "the lawyer of industrial policy", he points out 
that export is the key segment of a successful industrial policy, and vice versa, that a successful 
export is not possible without a successful industrial policy. Cerovic et al. (2014) have shown 
that the lack of an adequate industrial policy was actually the main problem of relatively slow 
and unsustainable reconstruction and development of transitional countries’ economies. 
Neglecting the importance of industrial policy in these countries had led to a sharp decline 
in industrial production and to over-rapid growth of the services sector, which resulted in 
an apparent lack of tradable goods for export and consequent deficit in their trade balance 
sheets. 
Simplified understanding of the expected effects of the transition process led to, as we 
have seen, suboptimal results, which created a need to develop a new growth model for those 
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countries. Conception of a new growth model must take into account the importance of 
neglected policies in the transition concept, a greater participation of tradable goods, and 
especially the increasing role of industrial policy. These measures must be accompanied 
by greater investments in education and infrastructure as well as a more active role of the 
government, especially in terms of improving the institutional and investment environment 
in order to enhance existing business, but also when it comes to attracting new (large) 
investors. 
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Abstract
This paper seeks to look at the basic features of Taiwanese economic development 
and at the same time, it attempts to connect these elements to theoretical questions 
of economic development. While doing so, it compares the development process of 
the Taiwanese economy to those of other advanced economies in the region. Thus, 
the paper includes South Korea and Japan in the analysis. Although Singapore and 
Hong Kong have very different historic backgrounds and dimensions in terms of 
population and size leading to dissimilar maneuvering rooms, at certain questions 
the analysis refers to special experiences of the two economies as well. 
Keywords: China, Taiwan, Europe, economic structure, institutions
JEL: F-13, F21, F-31
1. Introduction
The squaring of the circle in economics is to find a general recipe to the economic 
problems of developing countries. Classic economists of the 18th and 19th century – focusing 
on microeconomics – did not pay too much attention to macroeconomic matters and 
economic development questions, then neoclassic economists of the 20th century believed 
in solutions which were supposed to be ‘one size fits all’ medicines to problems of both 
advanced and developing countries. The Great Depression can be viewed as a turning 
point in economics since John Maynard Keynes and the Neo-Keynesian economists later 
highlighted the importance of state policies in general and in particular in economic crises. 
However, only after WWII, economists started to address economic development issues 
1  Associate Professor at the Budapest Business School, Faculty of International Business and Management, Department 
of World Economy and International Trade. Email: moldicz@gmail.com
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by searching for reasons for backwardness, and policies to jumpstart economic growth of 
the poorest nations. Thus after 1945, development economics became one of the emerging 
subfields in the study of economics. Since then, its main goal has been to define the basic 
preconditions of rapid economic development, offering pragmatic answers to problems of 
underdevelopment. These schools of thought that became popular in the 1950s and 1960s, 
in the era of decolonization, differed widely from each other in their origins, methodology, 
and conclusions. (See later!)
The 1980s and the 1990s were dominated by neoliberalism which offered one-sided and one-
size fits all solutions. One of the most popular recipes was the Washington Consensus, which 
stemmed from 1989 and dominated the 1990s and the period up to 2008-2009. This paradigm 
that lost much of its popularity after the Global Financial Crisis, rested on two main pillars: 
more competition and smaller state (Ostry – Loungani – Furceri, 2016, pp. 38-41), whereas 
opening the economy often led to externally financed economic growth in many countries. 
This sort of growth was fueled in good times by foreign direct investments and in bad times 
by foreign credits creating financial bubbles. The prescription provided by the Washington 
Consensus also included privatization, open trade policies, and deregulation.  
After the crisis, this approach has fallen from pedestal. One of the main consequences 
has been the end of the foreign finance reliant growth model, see Iceland and the Eastern 
European countries. Another element which has changed economic policies of the post-Great 
Crisis period is the renaissance of industrial policies, bolstering the notion that competent 
bureaucrats are able to manage state involvement in productive sectors. 
No surprise, attention has turned to the economic development policies of China (‘Beijing 
Consensus’)2 which has been successful over the last decades, however, China’s experiences 
may influence other countries, but clearly, they are unrepeatable by any other nation, moreover, 
the outcome of the Chinese experiment is more obscure than ever. The ‘developmental states’ 
of the Far East deliver more relevant lessons to other developing or middle-income countries. 
As previously mentioned, there are still many different approaches to economic development 
problems, but there has been a growing consensus among development economists over the 
last decades, that economic and political institutions are crucial in explaining success or failure, 
as they are key elements in creating and maintaining a favorable environment for businesses 
and innovations, as long they are able to include broad layers of society. Acemoglu-Robinson 
argue that the way institutions within society are organized is decisive in the outcome, in the 
productivity of the economy and the well-being of citizens (Acemoglu – Robertson 2012). This 
is a very old argument; Lipset (1959) was the first social scientist who connected economic 
success to democratic pluralism, thus provoking debate. A modern version of this argument 
is to be found in Ferguson, who summarizes all these important elements of success under 
six headings: competition, science, property rights, medicine, the consumer society, and the 
work ethic (Ferguson 2011, p. 12). These “killer apps” not only characterize Western European 
countries, but Taiwan as well. However, these explanations put more emphasis on similarities 
2  The term began spreading, when Joshua Cooper Ramo published his paper ’The Beijing Consensus’. He underlined 
three crucial elements of Chinese success: the value of innovation, rejection of GDP per capita approach and self-
determination (Ramo, 2004, pp. 11-12).
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existing between Western and Asian success stories, while the ‘developmental state’ paradigm 
underlines discrepancies between Western and Asian free market models.
The term ‘developmental state’ describes one version of the free market economies, 
indicative of East Asian countries. (See the term described in more detail in Csáki, 2016, 
pp. 123-146.) This expression also refers to a state-determined, albeit more or less market-
friendly approach to economic development. Asian developmental states can generally be 
characterized by a strong emphasis on diverse forms of state intervention; however, these 
institutions differ to some extent in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.3 In this paradigm, 
democracy is a less pronounced variable in explaining success. 
The dilemma in the aspect of Washington/Beijing consensus, or developmental states 
arises is whether a convergence or divergence of economic institutions is to be observed. 
While different national needs require diverse policies, pointing to divergence in the models, 
economic globalization confronts these countries with identical problems, forcing them to use 
similar approaches, leading to convergence. Wan points out that there are essential differences 
in the literature with regard to the convergence/divergence question: “Modernization theorists 
argue that developing nations should converge with developed nations if they want to achieve 
development. Neoclassical economists also believe that national economies will eventually 
converge as a result of market forces or harmonization through political negotiations. An 
opposing school sees a persistent divergence among nations” (Wan, 2008, p. 22).
Rostow’s five stages growth model still can be viewed as a neoclassical approach to 
economics, since he develops a theory of uniform pattern of economic development (Rostow, 
1960). Gerschenkron goes one step further in his ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective’, emphasizing the role of the state. The more backward the country is, the 
more interventionist approach of the state is needed in channeling the capital to newborn 
industries. He clearly opposes the idea of uniform development, but he still believes in 
convergence (Gerschenkron, 1964).
Wan’s reference to the ‘opposing school’ includes very diverse schools of developmental 
economics, which in contrast to the neoclassical free-market counterrevolution, do not take 
convergence for granted. Moreover, one of these schools, the international dependence school, 
advises a delinking strategy to developing countries based on the assumption that coexistence 
of poor and rich countries is being dominated by such unequal power relationships that it 
makes it impossible for poor countries to catch up with the most developed ones (see e.g. 
the works of W. Arthur Lewis, Hollis B. Chenery, Gynnar Myrdal, Celso Furtado and Raul 
Prebish). 
Instead of delinking, Taiwan and other developmental states chose another strategy, and 
they became successful in an ever-changing global economy by adopting globalization-
friendly policies. In our comparison, which only includes the most developed nations of 
East Asia, the delinking strategy was never an option or a real alternative. Market-friendly 
economic policies pursued by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have been very different in 
3  Hong Kong and Singapore are not only different because of their size, but also their position on democratic values 
is also dissimilar. Taiwan, Japan and South Korea without doubt have inclusive democratic institutions, while Hong 
Kong’s special status and Singapore, which has been featured as a partly free country in the Freedom House Report 
(2014), create different links between the economic and political institutions of these countries. 
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nature. The degree of economic openness of these countries has f luctuated over time, 
depending on whether good times or bad times prevailed in international politics and the 
world economy. This means that a favorable business environment has always encouraged 
countries to go further toward liberalization (for example in the 1990s). However, crises have 
from time to time exposed the vulnerability of these countries, caused by their openness and 
dependence on external powers and economic forces. 
Certainly, the developmental state model does not mean homogenous solutions in these 
countries, each of them has idiosyncrasies. In order to demonstrate the different nature of 
the Taiwan model, the next section first looks at the mainstream explanations of the success 
of Taiwan.
2. Basic elements of the Taiwan model
2.1. Effects of colonization
There are some basic elements of Taiwan’s success on which there is broad consensus among 
scholars.4 It is clear, by and large that the economic development of mainland China and 
Taiwan were determined by more or less the same forces up to 1895. Only after the Japanese 
seized the island, different patterns of development began growing and getting visible. These 
similarities enable us to ask the following questions: What is common in the two regions? And 
what are the elements of industrialization which distinguish the Taiwan region from Western 
Europe? 
An often-recurring argument is cultural differences must lead to different forms of 
capitalism. Max Weber was the first researcher who paid attention to the importance of 
cultural, ideological influences and religion while explaining the successes of Protestant 
North European countries. The limitations of this explanation are palpable if one 
considers the divergent path of economic development in the two Korea or Germany. This 
differentiation cannot be explained by diverse cultures or languages in these cases. However, 
John Hicks’ notion of the market gives us better understanding of the Chinese and Taiwanese 
developments (Hicks, 1969). He states market economies of the past always coexisted with 
„customary” and „command economies”. In the case of Imperial China, there were three 
kinds of economies which could be distinguished: (a) a customary economy which was based 
on kinship, friendships, relations, emerged when self-sufficiency gave way to economic 
cooperation. (b) Along with the creation of a state, a command economy was created. The logic 
of economic cooperation was of ideological or liturgical in this case. Liturgical arguments were 
used to collect the tax revenues, for example. (c) The market economy which only emerged in 
4  Although Taiwan’s successes of the 1980s and 1990s are much less likely to be explained by differences in culture, or 
by Sun Yat-Sen’s legacy, it is another line of reasoning many pundits use. It attempts to emphasize the importance of 
cultural values, mainly pointing to Confucianism. Confucian values might be important in these economic successes, 
however, only when comparing this region to the rest of the world. Even in this case, Confucian values do not offer a 
rationale for why the catching-up process of these countries did not start earlier. Another cultural aspect originates 
from Sun Yat-Sen, who had had a strong influence on the foundation of the Republic of China (ROC), and in establishing 
the characteristics of the initial setting of the state.
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the 18th century in China could complement the customary and command economy and it 
could efficiently encourage private households to produce for the market. Karl Polanyi uses 
the term Great Transformation; however, he clearly connects the creation of the market to the 
emergence of the state which is obviously not the case in China. Since policies of the imperial 
China failed to boost the development of a market economy, China’s economic failure had a 
deep impact on the country’s political history. Although the country was never colonized, the 
last decades of Imperial China were determined by colonial empires.   
The fundamental difference between China and the Taiwan region is that after 1895, the 
Japanese effectively implemented policies aiming at the integration of Taiwan with Japan’s 
imperial market economy. The Japanese launched modernization programs, including public 
health reforms, reforms of the land property rights system, transportation, the money supply, 
standards as well as upgrading administrative capabilities. Although by the end of the Japanese 
colonization, customary and Chinese liturgical economies were already declining, there were 
clear setbacks after 1949. In 1945, the Nanjing government took over former Japanese firms 
and transformed them into state-owned and state-managed companies which was the base 
of planned economy. The government also set up an agricultural procurement system, while 
at the same time it imposed control over foreign trade and the money supply. In the decades 
after 1949, a dual strategy was implemented: This was the promotion of exports to the global 
economy, while protecting domestic firms, coupled with selective industrial policies. 
After 1949, when the communist seized the political and economic power in China, the 
liturgical command economy was only replaced by another type of command economy, 
so effective industrialization of China only could take place after 1992. In comparison, the 
failure of the Chinese industrial development can easily be measured by comparing changes 
in productivity. As Wu-Xu emphasizes: „In terms of value added per person employee in 1990 
PPPs, with Taiwan equal to 100, the comparative level of labor productivity for the Chinese 
economy as a whole was 50 in 1950, fell to 17 in 1973, declined to 15 in 1990 and only then 
showed a slight improvement to reach 18 in 1998” (Xu-Wu, 2007, p. 100-101).  
Ranis (2007), Booth (2007), and Thorbecke & Wan (2007) also highlight the overall positive 
effects of Japanese colonization between 1895 and 1945. Ranis put it this way: “Taiwan’s 
colonial heritage undoubtedly made an important contribution to subsequent economic 
growth. The Japanese colonial administration—if for its own selfish reasons, such as its need 
for sugar and rice—expended substantial resources and attention on Taiwan’s rural sector, 
in the form of road, drainage, irrigation and power construction projects. It also improved 
the rural institutional infrastructure through promotion of agricultural research, creation 
of experimental stations and, most importantly, the establishment of farmers’ associations” 
(Ranis, 2007, p. 37). 
When it comes to the effects of Japanese colonization, Taiwan stands out, since colonization 
rarely generated positive effects in other colonized countries. Fukuyama, referring to 
an unpublished paper by Matsuzaki, states that the success of state-building in this case 
depended much on the autonomy of the agents on the ground (Fukuyama, 2015, pp. 313-322). 
That was a good start for economic development, however the benefits were clearly restricted 
to improvements in the island’s infrastructure.
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan‘s big push theory which underlines that a minimum level of 
resources must be devoted to economic development in order to have at least a chance 
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of success, was developed in the 1940s. Although this approach seems to be a plausible 
explanation to Taiwan’s success at first glance, the problem is that it advocates large scale 
industrialization, which was never the case in Taiwan. But not only in Taiwan, as critics of the 
theory claim, but no economy could grow rapidly and catch up only relying on state-funded 
industrialization programs. 
Maybe not the big push, but the first push that came from the US, mattered. Most experts 
(Ranis, 2007; Booth, 2007; Thorbecke & Wan, 2007) also agree on the importance of US aid 
of the 1950s and 1960s, and that this was one of the few building blocks of success, which was 
shared by Japan and South Korea, as well as in Europe by Germany, France, and Italy (through 
the Marshall Plan). Beyond US aid, American influence was decisive in the formulation and 
implementation of the new export-oriented economic strategy of the 1960s and the redressing 
of the science technology policy in the 1980s.5 
2.2. Land reform 
The success of the land reform after WWII was another shared element of the Taiwanese 
development story with South Korea and Japan. In each case, the land reform was considered 
as an initial condition which significantly contributed to subsequent industrial successes. 
Ranis contends that “A second, related and substantial initial advantage, shared in the region 
only by South Korea, was that of a three-step land reform, implemented between 1949 and 
1953” (Ranis, 2007, p. 37). In the case of Taiwan, it provided savings, the necessary initial step, 
in order to build up a broad industrial base.6At the same time, land reform meant a shift in 
the structure of agricultural products as well; the new products7 required more labor, but they 
could be sold in international markets.8 
In Japan, Takada stresses the salience of agricultural reform as well. According to Takada, 
the American’s reform efforts targeted the break-up of the Zaibatsu system, the speed up of 
the land reform and the democratization of the labor market. Land reform meant “landlords 
were forced to sell their holdings of land. These lands were bought up by the government for 
redistribution to tenant farmers” (Takada, 1999, p. 8.).
2.3. Urbanization
An additional, maybe unintended, but important effect of the land reform was that 
modernization in Taiwan didn’t trigger a massive urbanization process, which is typical for 
industrialization in developing countries. Urbanization in Taiwan was gradual and slow. 
Booth emphasizes that fast-growing non-agricultural incomes in rural areas resulted in a very 
equal income distribution in the area (Booth, 2007, p. 97). The moderate urbanization and 
5  Greene (2008) looks at Taiwan’s science policy and its institutional development. The book emphasizes the role of the 
American politicians and scientists.   
6 Large landowners were urged to sell their land. The compensation helped them invest in industry.
7 Instead of rice and sugar, there was a heavy emphasis on mushrooms and asparagus. 
8  That is why Ranis contends this export-oriented period had already begun with the agricultural exports of the 1950s. 
He emphasizes that “Taiwan is one of the few countries that adopted a non-durable consumer goods-oriented export 
strategy as part of an increasingly competitive human-resources-based development path” (Ranis, 2007, pp. 40-41). 
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relative income equality improved the macroeconomic environment as well. This connection is 
described by Ranis: “… the features facilitated the implementation of a relatively decentralized 
rural industrialization strategy, which generated a workable competitive industrial sector 
that was less subject to the degree of industrial concentration and government directed credit 
syndrome of other Asian economies” (Ranis, 2007, p. 52).
Thorbecke and Wan placed the same process in a different context, highlighting the 
smooth inter-sectoral structural transformation between agriculture and industry. 
“Taiwan represents a textbook example of a country that admirably solved the set 
of issues related to the size, timing and form of the mechanism whereby a potential 
agricultural surplus is translated into a net f low of resources that benefits the rest of 
the economy” (Thorbecke & Wan, 2007, p. 62). With that, Thorbecke and Wan shift the 
attention to the process of capital accumulation. Much of developmental economics 
is concerned with the question of how surplus capital can be accumulated in a poor 
region, where due to the lack of capital low investment rates don’t allow for better 
technology; the poor technological level leads to weak productivity and to low income 
levels. Consequently, low corporate profits and low incomes for the workers are unable 
to generate strong demand, which would be an essential incentive for new investments 
and consumption. This is a classical vicious circle, often described by proponents of 
development economics (see Myrdal 1974). 
In development economics, one of the basic explanations of fast economic growth is the 
Lewis theory of development, which was formulated in the mid-1950s. In this model, there are 
two sectors: the traditional rural sector, to be characterized by surplus labor and the modern 
urban industrial sector, to be characterized by high productivity and demand for labor. In this 
concept, the transfer of labor from the rural to the urban sector determines the development. 
In other words, the emphasis is put on the rate of investments and capital accumulation in 
the urban sector. A similar argument can be found in the Marxist school of thought: Yevgeny 
Preobrazhensky stressed the salience of capital accumulation arguing surplus capital is to be 
accumulated by agriculture and these resources have to be channeled into industry through 
state interventions. 
It is clear that the Lewis theory has very strong limitations in the context of Taiwan, since 
there was no rapid urbanization leading to fast capital accumulation, and Preobrazhensky’s 
theory cannot be utilized here either, despite the existence of a strong state, because in 
his model state interventions also meant adaptation of no market-prices, typical in 
planned economies. Moreover, compared to Japan and South Korea, interventions by 
the developmental state in Taiwan were less forceful. As Ranis argues: “Admittedly, 
government intervention in credit markets remained substantial and directed credit 
was also in evidence, as was the important role played by informal, family-dominated 
allocation decisions—now generally maligned as ‘crony capitalism’. But it is also true that 
the notion that money creation was not to be used to shift profits to favored private or 
state enterprises—and certainly not to the same extent as was practiced in other East and 
Southeast Asian countries—came relatively early in Taiwan” (Ranis, 2007, p 41). Copper 
stresses the same feature in a different context: “There is another difference to note: unlike 
Japan, which has protected its manufacturing sector from foreign competition, Taiwan let 
its industries move out and encouraged global economic integration” (Copper, 2003, p. 178). 
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With that, he refers to a Taiwan-specific characteristic, which can be summarized as ‘less 
state, more competition’. This phrase, however, is only true in a regional comparison, and 
within the framework of a developmental state. 
2.4. Egalitarianism 
Egalitarianism, when it comes to credit market access and access in the workplace, has been 
another important characteristic of the rapid development of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. 
The strong connection between egalitarianism and rapid growth is obvious if one considers 
that there are different types of growth; for instance, growth induced by agriculture or 
mining, growth created by the domestic market or international market might create diverse 
effects related to equality in society. Andersson and Gunnarson put it thus: “These different 
sets of dynamics in the transforming economy have impacts upon the pattern of equality in 
terms of wrenching and leveling forces, i.e. when the dynamics of the growth process are 
interpreted in terms of shifts in the relative advancement between sectors and segments of 
the economy” (Andersson-Gunnarson, 2004, p. 7). 
Taiwan’s economic development could not be based on an abundance of natural resources, 
only on education, technology development, and other policies of a competent and efficient 
state which also included the adaptation of an egalitarian approach leading to a very equal 
income distribution. This is the reason why, along with South Korea, Taiwan’s Gini-co-
efficient9 (which captures the extent of income distribution) is very low: 0.28 in 2014. In Japan 
and Singapore, income inequality is much higher (0.31 and 0.46 in 2014, respectively). Looking 
at the income ratio of the richest to the poorest, a similar pattern can be perceived. The ratio of 
income shares of the highest 20 percent to that of the lowest 20 percent is only 3.98 in Taiwan 
and 4.42 in South Korea, while these figures are 5.13 in Japan and 12 in Singapore.10
2.5. Devaluation policy
In contrast to Western European countries, where integration of markets was linked 
to currency convertibility, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were not forced to liberalize 
monetary policy and money markets as early as Europeans did. They could take advantage 
from managed exchange rates and they clearly could capitalize on devalued currencies in 
order to boost exports. 
In the region11, Japan has had the most liberal exchange rate regime among the regional 
competitors over the past decades. When in 1971 Nixon announced that the US dollar would 
not be convertible into gold, Japan immediately switched to a managed f loating system. 
However, free f loating exchange systems were legalized only in 1975, at the Jamaica conference 
  9  Gini-indicator co-efficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 1 responds to total income inequality and 0 to total 
income equality in a society.
  10 National Development Council 2015: Taiwan Statistical Book.
11  Although being featured as developmental states, Singapore and Hong Kong share very different experiences not 
akin to those of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. As having been part of British Pound Sterling area, Hong Kong 
and Singapore pegged their currencies to the British pound before 1972, but all other currencies were fixed to the 
American Dollar (USD). In general, countries of the region benefited from this system, hence narrow fluctuations 
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of the International Monetary Fund. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Japanese Yen 
was under appreciation pressure. The Plaza Accord adopted by the United States, Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Japan triggered a new wave of appreciation of the Yen in 1985, which 
probably contributed to the Japanese property bubble in 1991 and the subsequent slowdown of 
economic growth. Since then, Japanese monetary policy has attempted to depreciate the Yen 
several times. (e.g. after the Asian financial crisis, and after the Global Financial Crisis). The 
new Japanese economic policy (Abenomics) has also included depreciation of the Yen.12
After a currency reform in 1949, the ROC government devalued the New Taiwan Dollar 
(TWD) in 1950-1951. After maintaining this exchange rate in the 1960s, and in the early 1970s, 
the TWD’s exchange rate was much less influenced by the government’s decisions, since 
after dismantling the Bretton-Woods system, exchange rates of capitalist countries became 
determined more and more by market forces. A foreign exchange market was established, 
and a managed f loating rate system was introduced in 1979, then a new wave of liberalization 
took place in 1989. Since then the most long-standing element of monetary policy has been the 
depreciation of the domestic currency in order to improve competitiveness. 
In the 1950s, a multiple exchange rate system was implemented in South Korea. The 
currency had an overvalued official rate and a more realistic exchange rate, in which trade 
transactions could be conducted. However, after the military coup in 1961, the currency was 
sharply devalued and a unitary exchange rate was introduced. In 1965, South Korea pegged 
its currency to the US dollar. Between 1971 and 1980, the currency depreciated several times. 
This regime was replaced by a multiple currency basket system in 1980. Not until 1990 was the 
so-called market average system introduced, which determined, “the exchange rate against 
the US dollar within a specified range around the weighted average interbank rates of the 
previous day” (Nam-Kim, 1999, p. 236). South Korea officially adheres to a “free f loat” regime, 
but official interventions are not excluded. 
bands limited the vulnerability of these countries to external shocks, and significantly decreased the scope of 
exchange rate fluctuations. After the era of Pound pegging; these countries switched to American dollar in the early 
70s when the British Pound was floated. Singapore has soon turned its exchange rate regime into a more market-
oriented one by first using a multiple currency basket, then by introducing a so-called monitoring band. Hong Kong, 
however, implemented a currency board regime in 1983. In this regime, the exchange rate is fixed against the USD. 
Stability of the regime is achieved by only issuing that volume of domestic currency which the country can back by 
its dollar reserves.
12  In 2010, the reform of the economic policy (Abenomics) also included other areas of economic policy providing 
a comprehensive policy framework. The government has launched reforms in taxation; in investment policies, to 
attract more foreign capital; and in employment and social policies. Despite the bond-buying programs of the central 
bank, a plummeting Yen, and the stimulus program, the Japanese economy is near to recession. One of the more 
plausible explanations is that economic reforms in the labor market, tax system, and migration policy have stalled.
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As it could be seen, the process of liberalization began much later in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan than in major Western economies, and it was more limited in its scale. No 
wonder, these countries have been often criticized by the Americans and Europeans for using 
devaluations as tactical weapons. The same criticism can be applied to the slow opening 
process of the banking sector.13
2.6. The industrial background—a short history and its consequences 
Table 1. Competitiveness indicators (2013-2014)
Global competitiveness
index Innovation Cluster development
Singapore 2 9 8
Hong Kong 7 23 11
Japan 9 5 7
Taiwan 12 8 1
South Korea 25 17 28
China 29 32 24
Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report, 2013-2014
13  The structure of the Japanese banking sector was highly influenced by the approach of the American Glass-Steagall Act (1933), 
which divided the banking sector into commercial banking and investment banking. After the war, the Japanese adopted this 
approach. Investment banks could accept deposits, but they were not as tightly regulated as the commercial banks which, 
on the other hand, were protected by the state in case of a bank failure. In addition, long-term banking was separated from 
short-term banking in Japan. This is not the only difference which distinguishes the Japanese banking sector, compared to the 
entire Asian region. The keiretsu groups found broad attention in the literature. These were groups of companies which were 
built around a bank. The advantage of keiretsu groups has been a long-term connection with banks, however it created a cozy 
relationship between government and business which led to the heavy extension of easy credit by government-guaranteed 
banks to closely allied companies. This business environment was the main cause of the Japanese financial crisis of the early 
1990s (Krugman, 2009, pp. 56-76). South Korea was able to avoid this trap by employing a different approach. South Korean 
banks did not hold shares in the firms; however, the government strongly directed the banks which were turned into public 
enterprises in the 1960s. Over the 1980s and 1990s, deregulation and liberalization were trends in the banking sector around 
the world; however, this trend was punctuated by the Asian crisis. As a response to the crisis, South Korea’s government 
launched serious reforms. After the Global Financial Crisis, South Korea was forced again to take stabilization measures which 
included: (1) generous liquidity support in Won and US dollars; (2) guaranteeing external debt of banks; (3) recapitalization and 
restructuring funds; and (4) SME’s access to credit (JP Morgan, 2002, p. 5). Thanks to prompt policy measures which enhanced 
the stability of the financial sector, the flow of money was not disrupted severely (IMF, 2014 p.11). The Taiwan banking sector 
underwent a similar metamorphosis beginning with heavy state intervention, and leading to liberalization. After WWII, 
Taiwan’s banking sector was highly regulated, because the KMT government, while facing galloping inflation, introduced 
controls on bank deposits, interest rates, and different banking transactions. In the period between 1949 and 1992, state-
owned banks dominated Taiwan’s banking sector. These banks channeled capital into favored large, state enterprises. Only 
in the late 1980s, and early 1990s, internationalization and liberalization started to change the sector: “By 1988 a significant 
proportion of regulatory controls had been swept away. In a significant move, the Ministry of Finance removed the restriction 
on the establishment of new banks. In 1989, the central bank began to put foreign exchange reserves in foreign branches of 
peer banks. This move enhanced their international competitiveness and set the stage for the banking sector to increase the 
number of overseas branches from 27 in 1990 to 149 by the end of 2001” (Chung, 2015, pp. 297-288). On the other side, several 
legislative changes made it possible to set up foreign banks in Taiwan. Liberalization in the banking sector, and the reliance on 
high domestic savings rates, added resilience to the banking sector during the Global Financial Crisis. 
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The Asian miracle started with a full-scale industrialization in Japan, and it continued in 
South Korea and Taiwan. Later, in these countries, labor-intensive production of the early 
stages was replaced by capital-intensive production. 
Although the fundamentals in these economies were very similar, catching up with the 
West took place in different epochs, led by Japan, where the well-designed policies and 
traditions of early 19th and 20th century industrialization created a favorable environment for a 
successful economic “take-off” (Rostow 1960, pp. 4–16). In the “f lying geese paradigm”14, Japan 
was followed closely by South Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan’s industrialization started with the 
labor-intensive textile sector, of which the pattern can be found in Japan and South Korea as 
well, however, later stages of industrialization were quite different as public enterprises were 
emphasized less in South Korea and Japan than they were in Taiwan. 
Only after the second oil crisis did Taiwan’s modern and internationally competitive sectors 
emerge. In the 1980s, the emphasis on the ICT sector turned the Taiwan Area into one of the 
largest ICT exporters in the world economy. After significant investments in China, Taiwan’s 
importance began decreasing in this segment, but its role as a powerhouse of ICT production 
still remains. When it comes to cluster development and innovation, Taiwan stands out 
among its regional and global competitors (see Table 1).
Liberalization and privatization of publicly owned enterprises took off in the 1990s, 
however, even today, there exist limitations on foreign ownership. “In its 2015 Investment 
Climate Statement on Taiwan, the US Department of State also underscored stalled progress 
on the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign ownership caps in 
the telecommunication, television, and transportation sectors as weaknesses in Taiwan’s 
investment climate” (Rosier–O’ Connor–Cuevas, 2016, p. 20). As of 2012, In Taiwan there 
are 19 state-owned enterprises, and on grounds of security and environmental protection, 
it limits foreign ownership in public utilities, power distribution, natural gas, postal service, 
telecommunications, mass media, and air and sea transportation (US, Department, 2015a). 
However, Taiwan is not alone with this attitude: South Korea restricts foreign ownership in 27 
industrial sectors, which is well above the OECD average. In contrast, there is only one formal 
14  In the flying gees model, the main driver of industrial change is the leader’s (Japan’s) need to minimize labor costs, 
based on shifts in comparative advantages. The concept suggests that industrialization and internationalization 
of production spreads from one low wage country to another. The mechanism only sets in when competitive 
advantages of the first low wage country have been fully exploited. But on the other hand, recent technological 
changes pose new threats since they diminish the importance of wages; since more and more labor phases can be 
carried out by automation that constrains economic policies exploiting wage differences. It is clear that latecomers, 
(China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) are already facing this challenge. This also increases pressures on 
Taiwan to adjust its industrial policies. In other words, it is a key question, where production takes place, but it is 
equally or even more important where are the hubs of chains of production in the region. Dominant players of 
supply chains are Japanese, South Korean, Taiwan, and more and more Chinese firms, while American and some of 
the European companies are also able to take part in this regional competition. (1) The more centralized Japanese 
model differs from that used by European and American firms, which are more willing to share knowledge and 
technology. (2) Small Chinese firms usually have familial, flexible networks, however, they are much less likely to 
build supply chains. Only giant state-owned enterprises have sufficient capital to organize supply chains, but the 
question which still remains is whether they can do it in a sufficient way. According Goa, the profitability of SOE’s 
is roughly comparable to that of non SOE’s, but only in sectors in which they have monopolies. (Gao, 2010a) (3) 
Taiwan’s networks have a mixture of Japanese, Chinese, and Western elements, which enable them to pick the most 
successful elements of adaption and organization.
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limitation on foreign ownership in Japan, which provides the most liberal, investor-friendly 
legal environment in the region—at least on paper, since despite this freedom, foreign firms 
do not dominate investments carried out in the country.
2.6.1. Firms
Table 2. Expenditures on research and development (2014, percent of GDP)
Japan 3.54
South Korea 4.30
Taiwan 3.00
China 2.05 
Source: OECD database
The other obvious difference among these countries—often reflected in the literature—is 
that Taiwanese firms are smaller than those of South Korea, and Japan. The significance of 
this can be seen in Taiwan’s weakness in creating global brands, but maybe more importantly, 
the capital which stand at the disposal of these firms is more limited. This might be one of the 
reasons why expenditures on research and development are significantly lower than those in 
Japan and South Korea, since with research and innovation, the amount of invested capital, 
and thus the firm’s size, matters (see Table 2). 
However, there are advantages as well created by the same circumstances: (1) Wan states 
that firms in Taiwan are less willing to borrow money from capital markets and as a result 
they are less vulnerable to financial shocks (see e.g. the case of the Asian crises of the late 1990s; 
Wan, 2008, p. 201). As the backbone of the Taiwan economy consists of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), reduced exposure of SMEs to external funding enhances financial 
stability on a macroeconomic level. (2) According to Wu, the dominance of these small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can be traced back to “Taiwan’s dual market structure” (Wu, 
2005, p. 325). He explains this duality the following way: “We need to distinguish between 
two different marketplaces. The first market consisted of the upstream and intermediate-
stream industries in which SOEs and LEs operated. The second market was the downstream 
industries dominated by the SMEs. The state governed the first market while leaving the 
second to market forces”15 (Wu, 2005, p. 329). Operating in an environment shaped by market 
forces gave the advantage that Taiwan’s success depends less on state economic policies, since 
the bulk of the region’s success was created by small and medium-sized enterprises.
In many countries, industrialization is linked to foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. 
Poor and middle-income Asian countries are characterized by FDI-led industrialization while 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea based their development on domestic savings (See 2.3). The 
latter countries have been the main sources of foreign direct investments for developing 
Asian nations as well. Between 1990 and 2014, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were net FDI 
15 SOEs: state-owned enterprises; LEs: large enterprises.
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investors; most of the FDI was directed into China, Thailand, and the Philippines. As a result 
of FDI-led industrialization, the regional division of labor has changed. Over the last few 
decades, de-industrialization has characterized FDI exporter countries (Taiwan16, Japan, and 
South Korea), while industrialization has only speeded up in the net FDI importer countries.
2.6.2. Supply Chains 
Industrial states of the 19th and early 20th centuries (US, Germany, Japan etc.) built up their 
own industrial bases while relying on their domestic markets. In the late 20th and 21st 
centuries, economies of scale do not allow for this strategy: latecomers have to find their 
niche in the global supply chain. So industrialization of these countries has been linked 
to internationalization, and building regional/global supply chains. That is why the late 
industrialization of China—without any exaggeration—has changed the entire region. The 
process has altered the main patterns of manufacturing, not only in Asia, but in the entire 
world economy. Based on manufacturing output, China alone accounts for more than one-
fifth of the production of the world (2012: 22.2 percent). The United States ranks second on 
this list, with Japan in third place (Meckstroth, 2014). 
The economy of Taiwan fully used chances to cooperate with China. Taiwan has a highly-
developed economy. For the time being, Taiwan’s economy is the size of the Belgian economy 
(US$490 billion in 2014). But, adding the performance of Taiwanese firms operating in China, 
“Chiawan”17 generates around US$700 billion, which equals the size of the Turkish economy, 
or that of South Korea. There are also estimates regarding the Chinese workforce working in 
Taiwan firms. These calculations range from 13-15 million and 20-23 million workers. The last 
figure is roughly equal to the entire population of Taiwan (Lee-Makiyama–Messerlin, 2014, p. 3).
The future of Chinese economic development, and the catching-up process, seems to be 
more opaque than ever, as the recent slowdown of the Chinese economy reveals fundamental 
problems which economists usually summarize with the term “middle-income country 
trap.” This refers to scores of problems which fast-growing economies face when they can 
no longer base their development on low wages. As a result of successful modernization and 
industrialization, incomes have risen significantly in China, in particular along the coastal 
regions. But due to higher wages, this economic model won’t be tenable in the long run, which 
is why new competitive advantages must be sought. The shift to a new model accompanied 
by deep structural changes in the economy, with more emphasis on the service sector and a 
higher added value, is not an automatic process; there is no guarantee of success. Because of 
these challenges, Taiwan’s reliance on China as a broad industrial base has already changed, 
and the new situation requires strategic decisions be made in Taipei.18
16 While in 1983, manufacturing accounted for 42.80 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, this ratio decreased to 29.80 percent in 2012.
17 The term ‘Chiawan” refers to added value generated by Taiwanese firms in Taiwan and China.
18  The other part of the difficulties derives from the political institutions of China. Mixin Pei connects the problem of 
political institutions to economic challenges: “The absence of a competitive political process and a free press in China 
makes these high-risk sectors even more susceptible to fraud, theft, kickbacks, and bribery” (Pei, 2007, p. 3). Mary 
Gallagher states that in fact the Chinese liberalized economy doesn’t necessarily lead to a less authoritarian political rule 
(Gallagher, 2002, p. 340). Although successful countries tend to be democratic ones, (limited) liberal economic regimes 
can be found even in non-democratic countries.
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3. Theoretical conclusions 
Chalmers Johnson was the first to conceptualize the term ‘developmental state’. He 
emphasized the competent and far-sighted bureaucracy as a defining feature of the Japanese 
economic miracle. The purpose in making a distinction between capitalist and capitalist 
economies was to call attention to differences, not to similarities in these economic systems. 
He put it like this: “One of my purposes in introducing of the “capitalist developmental state” 
into a history of modern Japanese industrial policy was to go beyond the contrast between the 
American and Soviet economies” (Johnson, 1999, p. 32).
Later, the concept of ‘developmental state’ became popular, and major contributions 
were made by Alice Amsden (Asia’s Next Giant), Robert Wade (Governing the Market), 
and others. However, the emphasis was shifted in some cases, some analysts highlighted 
infrastructure, policy tools (saving and credit giving schemes, foreign investments, 
export zones, government interventions to spread technology etc.), history, culture. Only 
Hong Kong adopted a free market approach among the Asian Tigers. In South Korea and 
Taiwan, where governments were not democratic, economic performance was needed to 
legitimatize the political regimes. One of the often recurring argument is that a strong 
state is needed to mobilize resources for public goods, since only a strong state is able to 
convince people and firms that painful political adjustments are necessary to make the 
economic breakthrough. At the same time, politicians must be credible in the strategy to 
convince the private sector.  
Macroeconomic and political stability are crucial; they are preconditions for economic 
success. Political stability, as we could see, was not necessarily associated with democratic 
regimes in the early stages of economic development, as authoritarian regimes built strong 
and efficient states. In each of the cases, import-substituting policy was part of history, 
however, it was short-lived. Another common element in the economic development of these 
countries was the importance of agriculture, which was not heavily-taxed and agricultural 
workers were not impoverished. A strong social infrastructure of family, local communities 
supported by the culture, a modern physical infrastructure financed by governments and 
donors are to be found in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In each case, the ‘benevolent’ 
external supporter – the United States, pursuing its own political and economic interests – is 
also there to aid the countries and to advise the elites of these societies. 
These are the most important elements of the developmental state concept. Peculiarities of 
the industrialization process – structure of firms, the way domestic firms are linked to the 
world economy, the role domestic firms have in the supply chains – do differ, but differences 
do not matter a lot when it comes to success.
Although Taiwan is a developmental state with strong capabilities in enforcing strategies 
and policies of the state, it is still the economy in the analyzed group which has implemented 
the most f lexible and cautious attitude to economic development policies and techniques over 
the last few decades. As we can see, the firm structure in Taiwan is based more on small and 
medium-sized enterprises than the Japanese and the Korean model. Copper contends “Japan 
and South Korea, however, have far more large [sic] companies and more heavy industries 
than Taiwan. Hong Kong and Singapore, also high-growth countries, have almost none” 
(Copper, 2013, p. 177).
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The SME-based firm structure has two consequences: a more limited need and ability for 
capital accumulation at the firm level, and a stronger need for state incentives to save in 
private households. The downside of this otherwise highly efficient firm structure is that, 
compared to the size and developmental level of the economy, the weakness of Taiwan’s own 
global brands is apparent, which is a strategic disadvantage. However, the region does not 
have to face financial challenges, since domestic savings are more than sufficient, and the gap 
between savings and domestic investments is the highest in the region in Taiwan. Surplus 
savings have been invested more and more in China after the turn of the millennium, in order 
to leverage the comparative advantages of China, which are based on a cheap labor force. With 
the slowdown of the Chinese economy, this strategy faces challenges. 
Berger & Lester emphasize the threats of the Japanese path. Japan did not change its 
strategy when it had been necessary in the early 1990s, facing a slowdown. Japan created big 
internationally competitive firms, and at the same time it protected small businesses. This 
policy resulted in a dual economic structure, in which investments in other Asian countries 
were preferred over domestic reforms. The Japanese embedded mercantilism19 embodies a 
model where interests of large firms overwrite those of small firms and the majority of the 
population (Berger & Lester, 2005, p. 27). South Korea clearly tried to avoid this trap by relying 
much more on domestic economic development, however, there is a downside as well, since 
this policy has encouraged protectionism in South Korea, and made the country into one of 
the most protected economies among the advanced countries. Protectionism is evident in 
policies related to foreign trade and foreign direct investments.
Taiwan has more room to maneuver than its competitors, since SMEs are the backbone 
of the economy, and thus economic policy cannot be based on the protection of SMEs 
without losing competitiveness. The Taiwan developmental state is weaker but more f lexible 
in implementing policies than its competitors. Stricter rules and policies with regard to 
exchange rates and foreign direct investments merely demonstrate security concerns over a 
Chinese takeover of strategically important firms. 
In other words, Taiwan’s specialty has been a cautious, but in some aspects unconventional, 
economic policy, which has clearly been different from that of Japan and South Korea. This economic 
policy has been able to rely on strong small and medium-sized enterprises and on substantial 
domestic savings, reinforcing stability and the freedom of economic strategy and planning.
4. Practical conclusions for Europe
Taiwan’s economy offers various opportunities to European firms, however, there are limitations 
in several areas, which basically can be traced back to the non-conventional implementation of 
trade and investment policy measures which by and large attempt to limit foreign participation 
and influence in different markets. In this area, it is evident that European investments do not 
pose any risks to the nation’s economic security hence redressing policies regarding European 
investments would improve and strengthen economic ties between Taiwan and the EU.  
19  It is mercantilist because economic growth is based on the dynamism of exports, whereas the sectors producing 
non-tradable goods and services are protected.
Csaba Moldicz Differences in East-Asian Economic Institutions and Consequences for European Countries or the Squaring of the Circle 67
The unsolved political questions have heavily affected Taiwan’s trade relations. To add to 
the problems, after early and profound successes in the implementation of the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement signed between China and Taiwan, further advances have 
been limited by a growing sense of economic security, and economic independence in Taiwan. 
From a European perspective, there are clear benefits from the cooperation to gain (see 
Table 3). The reason for this optimistic assessment is that Taiwanese firms’ capital and 
technology (e.g. ICT, solar panels) offer chances for firms in EU member states, especially in 
Central European countries, which still can be featured by suffering from capital scarcity and 
by the need for technology imports. Relatively low wages in Central European manufacturing 
firms could be incentives for Taiwan-FDI in the region as well, especially in Hungary, where 
the re-industrialization process of the economy has been supported by the government since 
2010. Since the backbone of the Taiwanese economy consists of SMEs, specialised in ICT and 
other high-tech related areas, there are excellent opportunities for European SMEs as well. 
However, these are limited by trade barriers that could be loosened by signing a comprehensive 
trade and investment agreement. 
Table 3. Advantage and disadvantages of Taiwan – the European view
Area Advantages Disadvantages
Industrial 
policies
1.  Innovation to buy (ICT, solar panels)
2.  Cluster development – broad industrial 
base
3.  Smaller firms with cooperation 
opportunities
4.  Smaller firms less vulnerable to external 
financing shocks 
5.  Net borrowing position is stronger than 
those of the competitors, consequently 
capital export to EU in form of FDI 
accessible 
1.  Smaller firms with small capital
2.  Relative weakness in building global 
brands
3.  Lack of natural resources
Trade
1.  The trade agreement with China (ECFA) 
gives plenty of opportunity for European 
firms to enter the Chinese market via 
Taiwan
2.  Infrastructure, border efficiency and 
operating environment belong to the 
best in the world.
1.  Excluding trade with China, most of 
the Taiwanese trade is regulated by 
the WTO, which can be assessed as a 
disadvantage compared to regional 
trade agreements 
2.  Market access, both domestic and 
foreign, is significantly lower than 
world average
Finances
1.  High saving rates
2.  Reduced exposure to global financial 
shocks 
1.  Limited access to financing for 
European firms in Taiwan 
Monetary 
issues
1.  Stability of financial markets
2.  Sound government finances
1.  Restrictions on foreign investments in 
bond markets
2.  Limited access to the domestic banking 
market
3.  Registration process for FDI 
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Abstract
This essay focuses on the problem of correlation between the universal and 
the national aspects of political modernization in the global world. The author 
emphasizes the fact that globalization boosts cultural pluralism in the modern 
world. The reliance on national culture and traditions has become a key feature 
of successful modernizations in China, India and other “Asian dragons”. The 
experience of post-communist transformation in Russia reveals the positive role of 
strong socio-cultural identity in the process of modernization. Despite the blurring 
of boundaries between countries and people in the global age, the socio-cultural 
identity still remains an important factor of enhancing the “blossoming complexity” 
in the modern world.
The issue of the correlation between the universal and national aspects of political 
modernization has been a subject of scientific discussion for many decades. The first 
modernization theorists (e.g. V.S. Neypol) argued that the Western civilization is universal 
and suitable for all mankind, and suggested that modernization and economic development 
contribute to the uniformity of different societies, generating a common universal culture, 
which is similar to the western world. Pioneers of modernization expected that the transition 
from traditional to modern society in the countries of the “catching-up” will proceed according 
to western standards. In this approach, the western political culture and political institutions 
of constitutional democracy were seen as the universal standard in comparative studies in 
countries of “catch-up” modernization.
However, the process of modernization transformations in Russia, Latin America, Africa 
and many other countries has shown that in modernizing societies traditional cultural values 
and political modernization goals often came into confrontation, creating a conflict of values, 
which often led to the destabilization of society, social divisions and “color revolutions”. 
Modern comparative studies in the field of modernization reveal that in cases where the 
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pattern of modernization is not approved by the values of national culture, they can trigger 
powerful social mass movement of protest, the desire to destroy, wipe out unpleasant political 
innovations, and return to the traditional political institutions. 
Cultural values and the goals of modernization often come into contradiction, because 
in many developing countries the goals of modernization were imposed by pro-western 
governments on societies that were not ready for modernization, with the majority of 
citizens not understanding and sharing western values and ideas. For example, more than 
40 countries in Africa have literally copied the Constitution of the USA. However, this fact 
did not bring them closer to the ideals of western democracy, but led to numerous political 
protests and social instability.
In response to these experiments with traditional cultures in the process of modernization 
was the splash of ethnic separatism and religious fundamentalism in modernizing countries. 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, a powerful process of “de-westernization” started 
in modernizing countries of the East: the world has started talking about "re-Islamization" 
of the Middle East, and the "return to Asia" in China and Japan. Promoting Western ideas 
of individualism, success, human rights, neoliberalism in these countries caused a negative 
reaction, when popularizing of these western values was called “imperialism of human rights” 
in the countries of the East.
UNESCO experts conducted a global survey which showed the following: only 11% of those 
surveyed identified themselves with the world in general or with a specific continent, whereas 
29% did with the country, and 57% did with the city or the province they lived in. The results 
of this survey undermine the hypothesis of the possible unification of the world's cultures in 
the process of modernization.
Hence, the majority of citizens identify themselves with the local community, which 
means they share the values of the local community, rather than the idea of universal values 
promoted during the process of globalization. That is why the hypothesis of a possible 
unification of the cultures in the process of globalization still remains under discussion. This 
issue is also profoundly studied in the work “Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the 
Contemporary World” by Peter L. Berger and Samuel Huntington (2003, Oxford University 
Press, USA), surveying globalization from individual countries of the five major continents.
Moreover, in the end of the twentieth century, many modern states, such as India, China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, started the new stage of modernization based not on following 
western patterns, but on the reconsideration of national traditions and cultural values in the 
process of modernization. There is a phenomenon of “Confucian capitalism” with lifetime 
employment and clan organization which is in many ways opposite to the western model of 
individualism and success. As a result, eastern people working for the sake of the family and 
for the sake of the clan were ready to work much harder than western people working for the 
salary and individual success.
The successful practice of modernization, built on the reconsideration of national traditions 
required a profound revision of the basic notions of modernization theory. Political scientists 
are now discussing the advantages of traditionalism in modernization: It became clear that 
reliance on traditional values in the process of political transformation can significantly 
accelerate the process of political modernization. Moreover, modernization appeared to be 
able to reinforce the role of traditions. For example, in China, in the period of transition to a 
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market economy was created the “Confucius Society”, which included leading philosophers 
from the Academy of Sciences. Their purpose was to reconsider the values of Confucianism 
(such as work, education, merit and frugality) and to adapt them for the targets of 
modernization. And they made a success of it: it was possible to explain to different sections 
of society (and in rural districts of China the majority of the population is still uneducated) 
the goals of modernization using the ideas of Confucian ethic.
Considering the successful experience of China’s and India’s modernization, where high 
priority were placed on national traditions, it is interesting to analyze the dynamics of 
Russia's modernization in the post-Soviet period. The period of post-Soviet transformations 
could be divided into two phases of political modernization in Russia: the “western” and the 
“neoconservative”. The “western” phase, which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
led to the ultimate demoralization of the Russian society before the onslaught of western 
ideology in all spheres of public life. The Russian political establishment of the 1990s openly 
preached western values and focused on western political standards, aggressively denying 
national traditions. As a result, national cultural identity of the masses was destroyed, the 
nation has lost self-esteem, and morale was low. People did not want to work, to create, and 
have lost self-confidence.
At the same time Russia, was confronting a serious economic crisis: the transition from 
the Soviet economic model to the market, in which privatization of state enterprises were 
accompanied by the destruction of industrial potential of the country. Privatization is 
a controversial topic in Russia owing to the pervasive cases of fraudulence and unjust 
distribution of wealth surrounding it. Compared to the indicators of 1980, the industrial 
production index decreased to 60% in 1998 and recovered to 80% only in 2001.
At the same time, fundamental changes in the national economic structure were made with 
a high priority placed on the commodity industry. The continuation of these trends would 
have ruined the national economy and the Russian society.
In response to the policy of “westernization”, Russia has always been building its identity 
as the eastern empire, based on traditional values, such as the religious and ethical principles 
of the national tradition. In the beginning of the XXI century, a new stage of deep socio-
cultural transformation in Russian political culture started, which could be labeled the 
“neoconservative wave”. Many Russian experts point out that in the early 2000s, there was a 
recovery of traditional values, such as statehood, patriotism, family values and morals in the 
public consciousness.
Restoration of the traditional national values, which provide a powerful motivation for 
labor activity in the modernization process, was one of the essential reasons for Russia's 
economic recovery in the past decade. During 2001-2008 (before the global economic crisis), 
serious progress had been made in the restoration of scientific and technological potential 
of the country. GDP growth rate in this period was at the level of 7%. By comparison, the US 
economy grew by 4.4%, while the Japanese did by 3.7% in this period.
The process of strengthening traditional conservative values, which takes place in the 
modern Russian society, has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is promoted by the political 
elites, supported by the majority of parliamentary parties, including United Russia, LDPR and 
Just Russia, as well as by the traditional confessions, including the Orthodox Church as well 
as the Muslim congregations. On the other hand, the majority of citizens, according to recent 
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polls, share and uphold the values of patriotism and traditional family values. Therefore it is 
both a political and a social process.
The global economic crisis, falling oil prices and economic sanctions in recent years hindered 
the growth of Russia’s economy and contributed to the ongoing downturn. In 2016, Russia’s 
economy was still experiencing the long recession. However, the International Monetary 
Fund forecasted that GDP would return to growth in 2017 with a gain of 1 percent. In 2016, 
industrial production, transport and agriculture were the main factors behind economic 
contraction. During the economic crisis, significant steps had been made in a direction of 
import substitution policy. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the total cost of 
the announced import substitution projects was estimated at RUB 2.5 trillion.
Polls conducted by VCIOM in 2016 show that 74% of Russians believe that their country 
is a special Eurasian civilization, which should not follow the western way of development, 
and only 12% consider Russia as part of the West. Considering this point, it is possible to 
conclude that traditional national values are shared by the majority of population in Russia. 
Incorporating the ethical values and core attitudes – such as family values, patriotism, 
conscience and generosity – in the modernization strategy, could be the key to success of a 
new stage of modernization in Russia, with a priority placed on innovative technologies.
The restoration of traditional values in Russia in the past decade has united and brought 
together the society. Patriotism, respect for the traditions of national history have always 
been a source of social and economic raise in Russia. Together with the economic factors such 
as a stronger state regulation of the economy, the stabilization of property rights, as well as 
high commodities prices, this made a cumulative effect and contributed to the growth of 
economy in Russia.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the fact that globalization boosts cultural 
pluralism in the modern world. The reliance on national culture and traditions has become 
a key feature of successful modernizations in China, India and other "Asian dragons". The 
experience of post-communist transformation in Russia reveals the positive role of strong 
socio-cultural identity in the process of modernization. Despite the blurring of boundaries 
between countries and people in the global age, the socio-cultural identity still remains an 
important factor of enhancing the “blossoming complexity” in the modern world.
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Abstract
Over the last few decades, global competition has grown considerably, while in this 
competition, innovation is becoming the main trump card. The transition to a market 
economy in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, has paved the way for 
participation in a global innovation competition, and new players in innovation – 
entrepreneurs – have also appeared. The limits of the decentralized, free initiative are 
no longer present, and the strong financial motivation of innovators is not limited 
by the equalizing behavior typical of planned economies. Therefore, the question is 
why the furtherance of innovation in Hungary has not been promoted by evolving 
market conditions? What is the reason for this anomaly? Earlier research sought the 
answer through the analysis of macroeconomic factors such as low levels of R&D 
expenditure, size and structure of the IT sector, quality of education, etc. The author 
tries to show that besides the better examined macroeconomic factors, hidden 
behavioral attitudes are also present behind the innovation-inhibiting phenomena, 
such as low willingness for taking risk and learning, noncompliance with contracts 
and rules, and other "soft factors". The weakness of innovation is also closely linked 
to the fact that the opportunities and incomes of market players depend heavily on 
the "strength" of their ties to state or government institutions.3
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Introduction: Defining the problem
Hungary's innovation potential, considering R&D spending, is problematic comparing it 
not only to developed countries but to most CEE countries as well. In 2012, only in one EU 
country, Romania spent the state less as a proportion of GDP for innovation (including higher 
education). In addition, government spending on R&D (including higher education) decreased 
to GDP in 2012 compared to 2007, which occurred in few OECD member states. Among them, 
a larger fall than in Hungary happened only in one OECD country, namely Israel. However, 
public expenditures spent on R&D are much higher in Israel than in Hungary.4 Reducing the 
ratio to GDP on R&D of government expenditure is difficult to justify, even if this improves 
the share of GERD and BERD5 indicators and the weight of private expenditures within R&D 
expenditures – which is otherwise very low for Hungary – grows meaningfully (Figure 1). 
4  Particularly critical is the decline in public support for innovation in an era in which the transformation of the 
technological bases of the economy is driven by innovations and almost every other phenomenon is due to 
innovation. Nowadays, in a normally functioning modern economy, especially in developed countries, innovation 
accounts for 60-80 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Source: OECD Main Science and Technology 
Indicators Database, June 2014, www.oecd.org/st/mst; Eurostat and the OECD Institute of Statistics, June 2014
5  BERD = R & D expenditures of the business sector, GERD = (Gross Domestic) R & D expenditures, GOVERD = Government 
R & D expenditures, HERD = R & D expenditures of higher education. BERD, measured at constant prices, has grown 
strongly by 9% since 2000, while in 2000 it represented 0.36% of GDP, almost doubling to 2010 when it spilled 0.69% of 
GDP. But the high level of BERD measured in 2010 is largely a high-tech production at foreign subsidiaries; domestic-
owned firms only make little innovation. (See OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2012, p.304.)
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The small contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to growth in Hungary is attributed 
to technological progress and, in this context, weaknesses in innovation, which is still very low 
compared to other Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, this ratio also showed 
a downward trend and in the period of the global crisis slid straight to the negative range.6 
Regarding competitiveness, the situation for Hungary has not improved considerably in the 
last fifteen years and even deteriorated in some respects: In 2001, Hungary was ranked 32nd 
among the countries of the World in competitiveness7 and 41st in 2006.8 Since then, Hungary 
has been sliding downwards: In 2015, it was only 63rd in the World Economic Forum ranking.9 
Again, behind the decline in competitiveness, however, we can only suspect the weakness of 
innovation. Therefore, even if it is not the only reason for Hungary’s dramatic downturn in 
the ranking of competitiveness, it is definitely a decisive factor in the deterioration in this 
field.
The share of innovative enterprises in Hungary is the lowest in the European Union, 32%, 
which is about half of the similar figure in leading EU countries.10 Moreover, an overwhelming 
majority of innovative companies are foreign-owned enterprises and innovation activities of 
SMEs are sporadic if we exclude barefoot or poor innovations that are not included in the EU, 
OECD or national surveys. 
As a concrete example, it is worth mentioning here that in one of the most dynamic 
regions of Central Transdanubia, researchers found only 25 companies with more 
significant innovation capacity (Grosz et al. 2004). Based on the 2012 Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard, the innovation features of Central Transdanubia are as follows: 
“–  public R & D expenditures stagnated between 2009 and 2011, while there is a significant 
increase in entrepreneurial expenditures,
–  in non-R & D innovation spending over the above period there is a significant reduction 
in all regions except Southern Transdanubia, 
–  the willingness of innovative companies to cooperate is higher than the national 
average, while the number of registered European patents is below average, 
–  finally, due to the economic orientation of the region, in the high-tech sectors and in the 
knowledge intensive service sector, employment significantly exceeds the Hungarian 
average.”11
According to the IUS (Innovation Union Scoreboard) 2015, almost all indicators related to 
innovation are below the EU average. What are the reasons behind the innovation weaknesses 
  6 Source: OECD (2013): OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections, December
  7  Source:http://web.mit.edu/15.018/attach/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report%202000,%20part%201.pdf  
  8 Source: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2006-07.pdf
  9  Source: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-016/economies/#indexId=GCI&economy=HUN
  10  Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH): How innovative are Hungarian enterprises? http://www.szta.hu/blog/ksh-
mennyire-innovativak-a-magyar-vallalkozasok/
11  Ákos Szépvölgyi, György Fekete, Gabriella Baráth: Intelligent Innovation Specialization Strategy of Central Transdanubia. 
Central Transdanubian Regional Innovation Agency, 2013, p. www.kormanyhivatal.hu/download/5/4a/51000/KDRIS3-1.
pdf 
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of innovation activities? In our short analysis, we try to point out the specific institutional 
structure that plays a decisive role in the backwardness of the country.
Institutional determinants of innovation
Without a complex analysis of the institutional system in Hungary, we cannot answer the 
above question and we cannot explain why technological development and innovation did 
not really accelerate, and economic development – because of the above deficiencies – has not 
risen from time to time. Of course, in this short writing we could not carry out a thorough 
analysis of the functioning institutional system. Yet, we make two statements:
Thesis 1. Formal establishment of market economy institutions – from competition 
rules through income taxation to strict consumer protection rules – does not imply their 
efficient operation. Only efficient and truly well-functioning market institutions make 
possible and promote innovation activities.
Thesis 2. With regard to the complex institutional system, Hungary has not yet 
relinquished the institutional system that is characterized by a lack of actual competition 
for resources (cf. North et al., 2006).
New technologies and innovations – as many institutional economists and economic 
historians have convincingly demonstrated (e.g. North 1981, North 1990, Acemoglu et al. 2002, 
Grief 2006, Rodrik et al. 2004) – are not accidentally emerging and spreading in a society. 
They are rather consequences of the complexity of social relationships. It is important to 
emphasize that innovation is a social construction, and innovation occurs where it is allowed 
by the social atmosphere. According to Kornai (2010), five prerequisites are needed to make 
innovations and scientific achievements: 
1.) A decentralized initiative, individual autonomy and freedom; 
2) A huge reward for innovators, including fame and moral recognition; 
3) Competition; 
4) Free experimentation and acceptance of the associated failures; 
5) Available funds to be invested (pp. 40-41). 
All those social systems that lack these mutually interconnected elements are not suitable for 
further development. A number of analyses have pointed out the links between innovation 
and the social environment (Hollanders and Arundel, 2007, Havas, 2009, Bartha (ed.), 2007). 
Our approach is perhaps somewhat special in that, following Kornai and North, we do not 
emphasize the role of any specific factors, but rather their interactions. 
"Economists have carefully documented that there is no single factor explaining economic 
development – capital accumulation, human capital, resources, international trade or 
geographic location – to name but a few outstanding examples. Instead, it seems that the 
complex way in which societies structure human relationships – economic, political, religious 
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and other interaction-forming institutions – are the key to understanding why certain 
societies are capable of sustainable economic and political development" (North et al. 2006).
For example, the degree of capital accumulation or the human resources of the country alone do 
not explain either rapid growth or progress with a protracted crisis in any country. In the case 
of Hungary, almost complete system of formal market economy institutions are only vestigial 
realistic market economy institutions, many institutions exist only as a blank framework, which 
is only partially filled with real content (Sajó, 2008, Fleck 2008, Krekó – P. Kiss, 2007, Szántó-
Tóth, 2008, Tátrai, 2006, Belyó, 2008). The notion of the institution is not simply a published 
or legal form of operating rules. According to Schotter's classic definition12, we refer to the 
declared operational rules as an institution that emphasize the observable, realistic regularities 
of operation and not just the officially-declared rules that many rarely adhere to. Many of the 
"streamlined" market economy institutions introduced in Hungary during the change of regime 
and EU accession do not work efficiently: a significant part of these real interactions is at the 
crossing, partial or complete circumvention of the framework. Formal and real institutional 
systems have not come close to each other over the past few decades or even decades, and what 
is more, in some respects, they have moved away from each other.
And the point is precisely this: Behind the formal rules of behavior similar to advanced market 
economies, radically different behavioral patterns and regularities can be observed. If we look 
more closely at the reasons behind the lack of rapprochement to advanced, innovative economies, 
we find the following real facts and behaviors that are obviously irrelevant (see Table 1).
Table 1. Factors explaining the weak innovation of the Hungarian economy
Objective explanatory factors Behavioral factors
Strong path dependence, the survival of certain features and 
elements of the planned economy’s institutional structure 
(favoritism / protectionism) in distribution processes, 
consumer’s exposure, excessive, oppressive  bureaucracy, 
(hypertrophy of bureaucracy)
Low willingness for taking risk
Low level of social mobility. Rigidity of social structures Low level of docility and f lexibility
Corporate competitiveness is still largely determined by the 
relationship with the state, and less is built on productivity 
and innovation
Much of the companies and the 
population could not get away from the 
state
A significant part of the actual budget constraint on market 
players is soft.12
Not responsible for agreements, contracts, 
non-compliant rules, low pay morals
Over the past three decades, the success of the government 
has been loosely dependent on the successful operation of 
the economy. 
Low tolerance level, lack of openness in 
the use of foreign experiences. 
Source: Own editing
12  Schotter based his own definition on David Lewis' notion, which essentially was formulated for the institutions that 
Lewis created for conventions (see Lewis, 1969, p. 44).
13 See Dewatripont – Roland (2000).
Balázs Hámori  Katalin Szabó Innovation and technological renewal in a transforming economy 79
There is no need for a specific explanation for the restrictive factors in Table 1, in most cases 
the link between these factors and the weakness of innovation is clear. The linkage between 
the different objective and subjective factors is income without performance or innovation. 
However, among the subjective factors, the relationship between social mobility and 
innovation, openness, tolerance and innovation is not so trivial, so in some sentences it is 
worth illuminating these relationships.
In Brenner's book (1994), he illustrates with many examples that innovations appear when 
people are confronted with diversity. He says that in the course of history, always the countries 
or regions were the "f lagship" of innovation (from medieval Venice to the Netherlands to 
California), because of their geographic location (island or coast) natural and frequent 
encounters with strangers. Strangers taught locals that they were "possible in other ways" 
and encouraged them to depart from their routine. For this, however, there was a need for 
tolerance and openness towards other routines, habits, ideas. (The relationship is, of course, 
two-way, frequent encounter with diversity helps to develop tolerance.) In contrast, in the big 
continental realms (for example, in Russia), we often see examples of stagnation. Isolation 
makes societies balder, single-faced and rigid; encountering strangers protects them from 
rigidity. 
While Hungary is economically one of the most open EU countries, the export activity 
intensity is even higher than the German economy, paradoxically, this openness does not 
appear in the thinking of the population. All sociological surveys show that Hungary – 
compared to international data – is a closed country (as far as the population's thinking is 
concerned), and tolerance towards foreigners is rather low (Decso-Sík, 2007). According to 
research carried out by TÁRKI since 1992, after the initial rapid growth of 1992-1995, the rate 
of xenophobia f luctuated, and since 2002, with minor f luctuations, it remains fairly stable 
until 2011. Compared with previous years, the proportion of hostility towards foreigners grew 
in 2012, and remained high in 2013 and 2014 compared to the average of the 2000s. Data from 
April 2015 exceeded the highest level in 2001, and the share of xenophobic respondents rose 
from 43% to 46% (Sík 2016).
In addition, many of the country's indicators (the proportion of foreign-language students 
in Hungary, the extremely low level of foreign languages compared to the majority of EU 
Member States) is a rather closed and less tolerant country, which does not really support 
innovation. Openness and tolerance are necessary not only for relations with aliens, but also 
for accepting and tolerating innovators and innovations. If "hard, creative people" are treated 
with distrust and hostility, it does not imply the "soaring" of innovations. 
The lack of social mobility limits the innovation by the same logic as isolation from, and 
intolerance against, strangers. "Upward" people do not expect "opportunities to come to 
them," but are looking for them, trying to gain experience from elsewhere or from abroad, or 
strive to integrate into a community that is completely different from their own, from their 
original community (say, if they move from one part of the country to another).
Privatization that is the basis of a market economy alone does not make economic actors 
innovative. If producers and service providers need to innovate to gain profits, they will 
innovate if they have to invest, they will invest, but if they do have the benefit of merely 
using their own relational capital or some "well-established" monopoly, they won't feel 
aby motivation for innovation. If they can increase the profits of their company without 
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increasing the consumer surplus or without answering the market needs or even anticipating 
them, they will not innovate. We also know from the planned economy that the soft budget 
constraint or the dependence on state aid is not conducive to innovation. As many campaigns 
initiate to increase R&D, no matter how spectacular innovation or information strategies are 
being developed, any EU support is used, the innovation capacity of the economy can only be 
increased if the constraining factors are reduced: the budget constraint becomes harder, the 
role of relational capital and dependence on the state is weakened, and the willingness to take 
risks and mobility increases. 
The limiting factors of innovation are not independent from each other, rather they form 
a system. Economic actors should deliver outstanding performance in building relationships 
to state institutions and expanding their relational capital, not in competition or innovation. 
If they succeed in doing so, they can get higher rents without taking any particular risk. 
Innovation is a high risk, and it is much more attractive to risk-averse economic actors to 
have a low-risk relationship with the state. Such a fruitful relationship softens the budget 
constraints of "friendly" companies, and thus their budget constraints are more similar to 
the planned economy than the hard budget constraints of a market economy. The behavior of 
economic actors is adapted to this situation. Flexibility and learning ability are not so much 
needed, on the contrary: for the beneficiary companies, maintaining the status quo is the 
main objective. This in itself limits the efficient functioning of the economy and innovation. 
State-favored groups in the interest of maintaining the status quo will do their utmost to 
keep everyone away from "well-founded" economic positions. To this end, they significantly 
restrict competition and restrict the opportunities of emerging players. It is no coincidence 
that tens or hundreds of thousands of enterprising Hungarians have left the country and 
have moved to more open economies offering better conditions for competition, especially in 
developed EU countries. 
Some conclusions
Behind these highly intertwined factors is a social structure that restricts access to resources 
and opportunities within narrow boundaries, where opportunities are far from equal, and 
thus necessarily involve limited activities and findings in innovation.  
1. In the 21st century's global competition, innovation is the key to success. Hungary's 
overwhelmingly reprehensible difficulties, which are repetitive in their nature, are closely 
linked to the limited global competitiveness of the country, which is mainly due to the low 
innovative ability. 
2. The innovative nature of the economy is not exogenously evolving, but it can be explained 
by the institutional structure of the country, in other words the complexity of economic 
relations. 
3. The implementation of the formal institutions of the market economy does not mean 
that these institutions also become the observable rules of real economic behavior, and their 
implementation alone does not guarantee their effective functioning. The same formal 
institutions (such as a contract) operate in a completely different way in an open society than 
in a place where actors have limited access to resources. 
Balázs Hámori  Katalin Szabó Innovation and technological renewal in a transforming economy 81
4. Real conditions and behavioral patterns and attitudes behind the formal institutional 
structure do not really support innovation in Hungary. 
5. In improving economic innovation, in strengthening economic competitiveness, and to 
overcome the frequent economic difficulties that have been reproduced since the beginning 
of economic transformation, we can only expect sizeable progress to be achieved if these 
constraints are mitigated, dependence on the state is reduced, soft budget constraints 
harden, while tolerance and social mobility grow.
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What is populism?  
An institutional economics approach 
with reference to Hungary1
Zoltán Ádám2
Abstract
This paper conceptualizes populism in an institutional economics context. 
Examining the literature on populism in political science, it subscribes to the view 
that populism is a degraded form of democracy that holds elections in regular 
intervals as rituals of popular legitimation, but undermines pluralism and diminishes 
effective political choice. Based on the theory of transaction cost economics, 
the paper argues that populism is a form of government that reduces political 
uncertainties inherently present in liberal democracies, and hence mitigates 
political transaction costs. At times of crises and a mismatch between formal and 
informal institutions conditioning political exchange, demand for such a restricted 
form of democracy rises. This is what happened in Hungary towards the end of the 
2000s, in a period characterized by fiscal stabilization and the socially costly impact 
of the global financial crisis.
JEL codes: P10, P16, P48, P51, P52
1. Introduction
This paper examines populism from an institutional economics angle. Such an approach is 
not unprecedented but calls for some elaboration: Why do we need an institutional economics 
approach to populism? My answer is because we want to understand what makes populism 
a rational political choice for an increasing number of people in an increasing number of 
countries. I assume the underlying reasons have to do with the terms of political exchange 
in democracies, or to use an expression found in the institutional economics literature: with 
political transaction costs.
1  Versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth at 
Corvinus University of Budapest in November 2016 and at the departmental seminar of Central European University’s 
Department of Political Science in Budapest in October 2017. Comments by seminar and conference participants, as 
well as by András Bozóki are gratefully acknowledged. 
2  Assistant Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Faculty of Economics, Department of Comparative and 
Institutional Economics. Email: zoltan.adam@uni-corvinus.hu
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Such an exercise may serve multiple functions. First, it can shed light on the mechanisms of 
populism, a political technique feared by a lot of devoted democrats, and supported by a lot of 
others. Second, it can help understand the institutional economics of democracy by revealing 
the social and economic circumstances under which democracy can be expected to thrive. 
Third, it may enable a meaningful differentiation among versions of populism: left and right, 
democratic and authoritarian.
Hence, this paper lies at the intersection of two different literatures in social sciences: 
(i) the political science research on populism, and (ii) the economics of transaction costs. 
In what follows, I first present a literature review on populism, drawing on contemporary 
political science research in section 2. Next I elaborate on political transaction costs and their 
applicability to populism in section 3. I attempt at situating my theoretical arguments into the 
empirical case of contemporary Hungary, using Viktor Orbán’s praxis in power as an example 
of authoritarian populism in section 4. The paper concludes in section 5. 
2. What is populism? A literature review
Populism is a political ideology that questions the legitimacy of traditional political elites by 
claiming to be the true, and the only true representative of people. In consequence, populists 
have a tendency for undermining political plurality by questioning the legitimacy of their 
rivals (Müller 2016). For populists, ‘people’ themselves represent justice and morality (Shils 
1956), hence they claim to establish a direct, non-institutionalized link between government 
and the electorate.3
Technically speaking, populism is a modernized version of charismatic rule. In Max Weber’s 
classic treatment, a charismatic ruler “derives his authority not from an established order 
and enactments, as if it were an official competence, and not from custom or feudal fealty, 
as under patrimonialism. He gains and retains it solely by proving his powers in practice. 
He must work miracles, if he wants to be a prophet. He must perform heroic deeds, if he 
wants to be a warlord. Most of all, his divine mission must prove itself by bringing wellbeing 
[emphasis in the original] to his faithful followers; if they do not fare well, he obviously is 
not the god-sent master” (Weber 1978 [1922], p. 1114). In this sense, populist politicians are 
modern-day charismatic rulers, who retain power as long as they are seen to work miracles: 
alter social and/or international hierarchical relations, change the economic system, bring 
about a true sense of ‘social justice’ for subordinated social groups often labeled ‘the people’ by 
undermining the authority of discredited ‘elites’ (also see Gurov and Zankina 2013, Hawkins 
2003, Tismaneanu 2000).
Theoretically speaking, populism is a ‘thin-centered’ political ideology attached to a 
broader, more established ideological appeal (Stanley 2008). Populism typically uses more 
elaborate and politically better established ideologies to carve out a unique selling point in 
3  Direct, non-institutionalized links include leader-dominated political movements and parties, referenda and other 
forms of direct participation in political life by people. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez held multi-hour long public hearings 
broadcasted nationally (Ellner 2012). In Russia, President Putin hold publicly broadcasted meetings with cabinet 
ministers questioning their record in applying public policies (White and Mcallister 2008).
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the political market. In cases of rightwing populists this is typically nationalism or another 
form of rightwing authoritarianism. In case of leftwing populists, this is most often a version 
of socialism (Mudde 2004).
Yet, populism also has its own ideological trademark. As Cas Mudde argued, populism is 
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, p. 
543). Hence, populisms are meant to represent the true views and interests of those sidelined 
and subordinated by selfish and corrupt elites. In other words, populism includes those who 
had been excluded by traditional elites. 
Importantly, this is not necessarily a matter of democratic representation. Populists claim 
to be the true voice of people irrespective of the number of people they represent in terms of 
electoral results. After all, the volonté générale’s social and political status cannot depend on 
the sheer number of people realizing its true and inevitable manifestation. And who decides 
about what the volonté générale is of course are the populists.
In a similar vein, Federico Finchelstein places populism in a context of post-totalitarianism. 
He argues that modern Latin American populism, most saliently embodied in Peronism4, is 
the post-WWII version of totalitarianism, or “an electoral form of post-fascism” (Finchelstein 
2014, p. 469). In his account, populism refuses to accept any institutionalized constraint on 
executive power but is reluctant to introduce explicitly totalitarian rule. Although populism 
embraces electoral democracy, “[i]n populism, the legitimacy of the leader is not only based 
in the former’s ability to represent the electorate but also on the belief that the leader’s will 
goes far beyond the mandate of political representation. […] The elected leaders act as the 
personification of popular sovereignty exerting a great degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
majorities that have elected them. […] As an authoritarian version of electoral democracy, 
populism invoked the name of the people to stress a form of vertical leadership, to downplay 
political dialogue, and to solve a perceived crisis of representation by suppressing democratic 
checks and balances” (Finchelstein 2014, p. 477).
In a similar theoretical fashion, Takis Pappas (2016) argued that populism is “democratic 
illiberalism”, or in other words “populism is always democratic but never liberal” (pp. 28-29). 
This is because populists, on one hand, need to rely on popular legitimation so that they can 
claim to be the true and the only true voice of people. Hence, they hold elections. On the other 
hand, they – as the true and only true voice of people – cannot accept losing elections. As 
there are no better (i.e. more credible, just, morally better entitled, etc.) representatives of 
the people than they are, any contradicting electoral results should be outright dismissed. 
Cases in point are Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump: Orbán questioned the legitimacy of both 
the 2002 and the 2006 Hungarian parliamentary elections that he both lost, whereas Trump 
called the electoral process ‘rigged’ before the 2016 US presidential election and declared 
before Election Day that he would not concede defeat in case Hillary Clinton won. 
As Jan-Werner Müller (2016) put it, populism is “a degraded form of democracy that 
promises to make good on democracy’s highest ideals (‘Let the people rule!’).” This is to say 
that populism seeks to gain electoral support for an anti-liberal political agenda that aims 
4 Juan Peron was President of Argentina in 1946-1955 and in 1973-1974.
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at reducing the effective choice that people can make in politics. The question is, however, if 
political regimes built and dominated by populists can be meaningfully called democracies. 
Müller’s answer is an emphatic no: Populists are anti-pluralists and anti-pluralists cannot be 
democrats, as democracy is per se about pluralism. This answer appears to be in line with that 
of Kornai (2016), who claims that democracy cannot be illiberal.
Nevertheless, an influential part of the populism literature – and some important political 
actors referring to it – consider populism an important democratic force. Ernesto Laclau 
(2005) argues that populism is instrumental in mobilizing politically and economically 
oppressed masses against democratically unaccountable technocratic elites, multinational 
companies and international institutions. Newly emerging leftwing populist parties such as 
Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain make explicit references to such views, but older, 
more traditional leftwing parties such as Die Linke in Germany can also be considered 
leftwing democratic or progressive populists. Other leading leftwing political actors such as 
Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK can be labelled – and at times are self-
proclaimed – leftwing progressive populists.
Referring to their examples and emphasizing the structural weakness of democratic 
legitimation in capitalism, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) endorse populism as a potentially 
progressive political force. In the fashion of Laclau, they raise the problem of democratic 
legitimacy with respect to such politically influential but democratically not (or in their 
view not sufficiently) accountable actors as multinational businesses, central banks and 
international organizations as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. 
In this context and understanding, populism is indeed democratic – at time almost 
revolutionary so. The biggest populist success of past decades from this point of view has 
probably been the rise of Lula da Silva and his Workers’ Party that had truly transformed 
politics in Brazil and lifted millions of Brazilians from poverty. However, neither Lula, nor 
Sanders, Corbyn or Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras are populists in the sense I use the term in 
this paper: Neither of them can be considered anti-pluralist, seeking to restrict democratic 
political choice. They may pursue populist economic policies in the sense of expansionary 
fiscal policies that at times may well prove unsustainable, this does not render them politically 
illiberal, however.
Yet, authoritarian populism well might be leftwing. Classics in this brand include Juan 
Peron of Argentina and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, but Rafael Correa of Ecuador is also 
among lead representatives (Ellner 2012, Horowitz 2012). Evo Morales of Bolivia is hovering 
around the edge of the category (de la Torre 2016). Europe has not seen as many leftwing 
populists, but according to Pappas (2014), Andreas Papandreou of Greece and his Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (Pasok), established in 1974, can be considered one. Papandreou was 
populist, argues Pappas, for three reasons: (1) He was a highly charismatic, unconstrained 
party leader, with a highly nationalistic agenda, mobilizing against established elites; (2) He 
advocated strong government involvement in the economy and pursued unsustainable fiscal 
policies; and (3) He heavily relied on clientele building and government-created rents. Yet, this 
occurred in an institutional context characterized by a competitive electoral system and the 
provision of basic political rights. Hence, Papandreau does not appear to be an authoritarian 
populists, even if he was highly charismatic and built a clientele.
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Similarly, rightwing populists are not always authoritarian. Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, 
although also highly charismatic and relying on a clientele built around his personal authority, 
did not create an authoritarian regime for the simple reason that he could not overcome all 
the checks and balances Italy had been endowed with. Boyko Borisov of Bulgaria can be also 
seen as rightwing clientele-building populist, exercising unconstrained, personality-based 
rule within his own political party (Zankina 2016). Andrej Babis of the Czech Republic is yet 
another case of unconstrained personal rule within his own party, based on clientele building 
and charisma. Yet, neither Borisov, nor Babis have been able to dismantle the system of 
checks and balances in their respective countries, in contrast to what had happened in Peron’s 
Argentina, Chavez’ Venezuela or Orbán’s Hungary. 
Finally, another distinction has been made in the populism literature by Rogers Brubaker 
(2017) who differentiates between liberal and illiberal populisms. Observing that a significant 
number of North-West-European (NWE) right wing populist parties have recently shifted 
towards a distinctively liberal direction, Brubaker argues that a new type of individualistic, 
secular, enlightened populism appears to be emerging. This should be seen – he claims – to 
be derived from the ‘Pim Fortuyn moment’ that placed – first in the Netherlands, than across 
a large part of Western Europe – populism in a new social and political context. As opposed 
to traditional populists, Fortuynian populists stand up for individual freedoms, including 
those of women and sexual minorities, whereas depicting groups of society adhering to pre-
enlightenment, traditional social values to be the enemies. These are, of course, typically 
immigrant communities with Muslim backgrounds. 
This new populism is liberal and ‘civilizational’ in its social values, while it defends the 
liberties of ‘enlightened’ European societies against the ‘anti-liberal aggression’ of non-
European immigrants. The protection of individual freedoms, however, do not apply for 
the latter, and those claiming them individual rights and adhere to multiculturalism are 
regarded part of an oppressive leftwing social, political and intellectual elite exhibiting the 
‘dictatorship of political correctness.’ Rightwing civilizational populism considers oppressing 
the enemies of European civilization legitimate and indeed inevitable. Elements of this quasi-
liberal populism, argues Brubaker, can be traced in the Freedom Party of Austria, France’s 
National Front, the Netherland’s Party for Freedom, the Swiss People’s Party, Belgium’s 
Vlaams Belang, or the Danish People’s Party. They all subscribe to secularism, individualism, 
equality of women and homosexuals, and the values of western enlightenment in general, 
whereas all express markedly negative sentiments towards immigrants and especially those 
of Muslim backgrounds. 
In contrast, East European rightwing populists such as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and 
Lech Kaczynski’s PiS, do not appear to join this club. They keep distancing themselves 
from individualism and the values of western enlightenment, while sticking to a kind of 
communitarian vision of politics in which individuals are expected to subordinate themselves 
to the community manifested in the ‘nation.’ Hence, East European rightwing authoritarian 
populism remains to be anti-liberal, not only vis-à-vis external enemies but also within their 
home societies. As opposed to the ‘enlightened’ liberal righwing populism of Western Europe, 
East European rightwing populists use explicit religious references and identify themselves 
as protectors of Christianity. In the Polish case, this means a reference to a ‘closed’, illiberal 
version of Catholicism and an alliance with its representatives within the Polish Catholic 
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Church (Stanley 2016). In the Hungarian case, in turn, this has little to do with religious 
values or theological concepts of a good society. It is rather a secularized surrogate religion 
what Hungarian rightwing populism creates (Ádám and Bozóki 2016a), and hence it is also 
‘civilizational’, although this is a considerably less individualistic, enlightenment-based and 
liberal civilization than the one referenced by Brubaker’s NWE populists.
3. Populism and political transaction costs
The notion of transaction costs in institutional economics refers to the costs of economic 
exchange. These include (i) search and information costs, (ii) costs of bargaining and 
contracting, and (iii) costs of policing and enforcing contracts (Coase 1937, Williamson 1985). 
Not all types of economic transactions carry significant transaction costs, though. Recurring 
market transactions typically do not imply substantial uncertainties and hence neither 
impose large transaction costs on transacting partners (Williamson 1979). That is to say, 
one can buy or sell a loaf of bread in the shop around the corner with facing practically no 
information, bargaining and enforcing costs. Efficient financial markets also carry very low 
transaction costs: Information is symmetric, market participants are numerous, transactions 
are standardized, and completed fast and transparently.
Societies develop formal and informal institutions to mitigate transaction costs. Formal 
institutions include laws and mechanisms of sanctioning unlawful behavior. Informal 
institutions are norms and customs transacting partners adopt and obey to. The breach of 
informal institutions does not entail formalized sanctions yet it typically brings about severe 
financial and/or non-financial disadvantages (North 1991). Institutions in modern economies 
are capable of handling complex exchanges keeping transaction costs sufficiently low. In 
other words, economic quality is closely associated to institutional quality, whereas the latter 
depends on both formal and informal institutions and their mutual compatibility.5
Governance is about the management of transaction costs. In the classic treatment of 
Coase (1937), firms are conceptualized as organizations producing institutional mechanisms 
handling transaction costs of complex production processes. As producing cars, skyscrapers 
and collateralized corporate loans typically require the cooperation of numerous individuals 
who need to work together in a disciplined manner, they engage in collective action carried 
out in hierarchical organizations called firms. In other words, vertical integration tend to be 
more efficient in complex production processes than horizontal market relations. Yet, even 
this has been changing as new information and production technologies transform industries 
and loosely integrated networks become increasingly competitive vis-à-vis hierarchical firms 
(Hámori and Szabó 2016).
Political governance is also about the management of transaction costs. It is meant to 
maintain, regulate and control political exchange at reasonably low transaction costs. 
5  North famously referred to the potential mismatch between formal and informal institutions. Privatization can be done 
overnight, but the informal institutions within which private property and other core institutions of capitalism rest 
takes much longer to develop, he said with reference to the process of post-communist transformation in his Nobel 
lecture (North 1994). 
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Political exchanges are social interactions influencing the allocation of power, wealth and 
prestige in society (cf. Downs 1957). They occur both at national and local levels, and even 
within particular organizations, such as political parties, parliamentary factions, ministerial 
bureaucracies, NGOs, sport clubs, and – for that matter – firms.6 Political transaction costs 
depend on the efficiency of formal and informal institutions determining political exchange 
and their mutual compatibility. These institutions constitute political regimes.
I said in the last sentence of the previous section that populism seeks to establish ‘de-
institutionalized political regimes.’ What I meant was governance without the constraints of 
formal institutions: a direct, informal way of political exchange between rulers and the ruled. 
However, such a form of governance is also based on institutions, of course. 
Any routinized, recurring human interaction is based on institutions, and political 
governance necessarily does so. Yet, instead of formal, transparent and accountable institutions, 
it can rely on informal, non-transparent and non-accountable ones, in which agreements 
on legitimate actions are tacit and – at least to some extent – f luid, while subordination to 
unconstrained power-holders remains the rule. In other words, it is government not based on 
laws (i.e. legally defined, formal rules) but on customs, cultural preferences and the personal 
authority of leaders (who may or may not have Weberian charisma).
When does such a populist form of governance become socially dominant and accepted as a 
legitimate form of government (i.e. socially institutionalized)? My answer is whenever formal 
and informal institutions of political rule do not match, and the formally institutionalized 
course of actions by governments are not any more embedded in a web of informal, culturally 
defined norms and convictions. In other words, when liberal democracy with its entire 
apparatus of mutually constraining, formalistic, impersonal rule breaks down, and political 
transaction costs of democracy rise too high. Then the moment of populism arrives, and 
authoritarian populists can start slashing political transaction costs by reducing political 
choice. They do this various ways, among which I present two widely used political techniques: 
the left—right divide and ingroup-outgroup mechanisms.
3.1. Left- and rightwing populisms
Populism is about slashing political transaction costs by reducing the number of effective 
political alternatives. It is a degraded version of democracy because it constrains genuinely 
free democratic choice. This can be done in distinctively different ways, and populist, 
depending on their ideological orientation and institutional environment, offer different 
political alternatives.
One common distinction is the left—right divide. The camp of leftwing populists consist 
of Juan Peron of Argentina, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Evo 
Morales of Bolivia in Latin America (de la Torre 2016, Ellner 2012, Horowitz 2012). In contrast, 
Europe has not seen too many leftwing populists, but according to Pappas (2014), Andreas 
6  The institutional economics literature conventionally refers to the costs of setting up and maintaining social and 
political organizations such as political parties and state bureaucracies as political transaction costs (Furubotn – 
Richter, 2005, pp. 55-57). On the other hand, very few political scientists use the notion of political transaction costs in 
their scholarship. One notable exception is Zankina (2016).
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Papandreou of Greece and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), established in 1974, 
can be considered one. 
Pasok was populist, argues Pappas, for three reasons: (1) Papandreou was a highly 
charismatic, unconstrained party leader; Pasok advocated strong government involvement in 
the economy and pursued economic policies characterized by unsustainable fiscal provisions; 
and (3) Papandreou heavily relied on clientele building and the creation and stabilization of 
an us—them social cleavage. 
Other European parties that can be potentially considered leftwing populist are Die 
Linke in Germany, Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, but neither of them are leader-
dominated and rely on clientele building and the creation of social cleavages as much as 
Pasok did. Regulating markets and redistributing to the benefit of the poor does not in itself 
constitute populism as it does not necessarily imply an illiberal approach to power. Hence, 
Jeremy Corbyn of the UK and Bernie Sanders of the US are not populists either in this sense: 
They might be labeled democratic or progressive populists, and they well might be skeptical 
of capitalism, but they cannot be accused of political illiberalism.  
Rightwing populists typically employ authoritarian policies, such as infringing on media 
freedoms and building clienteles through the usage of public resources, and they also tend 
to form leader dominated parties. In contrast to leftwing populists, they typically do not 
pursue pro-poor policies, and a large part of their vote is recruited from the middle classes, 
whom they assist in retaining their social and economic status. Carlos Menem of Argentina, 
Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and Carlos Salinas de Gortari of 
Mexico are Latin American examples of such policies (Stein 2012, Weyland 1998, Gibson 1997). 
European rightwing populists often exhibit a pro-middle class bias, create leader-dominated 
parties, and seek to deepen social cleavages. Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen of France, Silvio 
Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi of Italy, Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Albert Rösti of 
Switzerland and Nigel Farage of the UK are examples in Western Europe. Viktor Orbán of 
Hungary and Jaroslaw Kaczynski of Poland are both rightwing populists in the Eastern part 
of the EU. In a sense, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey can be 
also considered rightwing populist as they both rely on democratic legitimacy while pursuing 
distinctively illiberal policies, although their conduct of power appears significantly more 
oppressive than usual in authoritarian populism, and hence their respective political regimes 
gravitate towards outright dictatorship.
3.2. Exclusion and inclusion by populists 
Both left- and rightwing populists seek to reduce political transaction costs by undermining 
the viability of their opposition, hence limiting effective political choice. This way, they create 
political and economic rents that mutually reinforce each other. As such government-sponsored 
rents are difficult to cut back, populist leaders may stay in office for protracted periods, in 
some cases for decades. Populists in power tend to become increasingly authoritarian, as the 
cases of Orbán, Putin and Erdogan demonstrate. However, there is an inevitable trade-off all 
authoritarian leaders face: The less democratic their political regime becomes, the lower the 
genuine popular legitimation they can claim. Although political exchange gets simpler and 
hence political transaction costs decrease as the regime gets increasingly authoritarian, the 
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costs of oppression rise and long-term economic performance tends to deteriorate (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2000, 2012). Populists, just as any other autocrats, employ ingroup-outgroup 
mechanisms to mitigate this problem.
In fact, governance always includes and excludes. Political actions in general and public 
policies in particular inevitably prefer some groups in comparison to others. Given the 
relative lack of institutionalized constraints on their rule, populist governments are inclined 
to employ ingroup-outgroup mechanisms by which they build political clientele and insure 
the political support of their favored electorate.
Preferential treatment can include various policies related to jobs, incomes, wealth or prices. 
As leftwing populists tend to constrain markets and intensify government involvement in 
the economy, this can manifest itself in job creation and price regulation. Those preferred 
by such policies can be considered ingroups vis-à-vis the regime. Rightwing populists, in 
turn, typically cut taxes on wealth and/or income, and provide beneficial public procurement 
contracts to their business cronies.7
Populists redistribute for those included and extract from those excluded. Most 
typically those included are politically associated with the ‘people’, but their socioeconomic 
characteristics depend on the left—right character of the regime. Leftwing populists tend to 
include the relative poor (although not necessarily the poorest who typically lack any form of 
politically relevant social capital) and exclude some of the rich. Rightwing populists typically 
apply an ethnic and/or religious criteria in their ingroup-outgroup distinction, often provide 
beneficial treatment for middle classes organized into their clienteles.
Inclusion by the regime always mean a deal. Operation of formal political institutions 
is of secondary importance only, as being member of the clientele is more important than 
norms and actions of an impersonal democratic rule. Those who accept informal rules of the 
regime (that at some point might actually be formalized) typically will not protest even if they 
perceive the mechanisms of redistribution unfair and normatively problematic. That is why 
corruption scandals do not work in populist regimes: all those included are ‘corrupted’ in some 
sense. Corruption is not the normatively unacceptable exception but the socially implicitly or 
explicitly approved way of survival in an informally governed, authoritarian regime. Hence, it 
simply does not necessarily make much sense to draw attention to its existence. Of course, it 
exists; this is how the entire society gets by.
Exclusion and inclusion help cut political transaction costs as they reduce effective political 
choice. Those who vote and make other political decisions are controlled through reallocation 
of resources, including information, money and power, by those above them in the power 
pyramid. Hence, society gets re-feudalized, although rituals of mass-approval of power 
remain in place.
7  Political practices of leftwing and rightwing populists are of course not mutually exclusive but well might be mixed by 
actual populists, whether on the left or the right.
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4. The Orbán regime
A prime example of current populist governance is Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Having served as 
prime minister in 1998-2002, Orbán took over government in 2010 for the second time. As his 
rightwing populist Fidesz party took two-third of parliamentary seats, Orbán could alter the 
entire constitutional system as an unconstrained populist leader (Ádám and Bozóki 2016b). 
Note that a two-third majority was relatively easy to attain in the individual constituency 
based Hungarian electoral system, in which the majority principle has dominated since 1990. 
In consequence, a majoritarian approach to power, generally characterizing populist parties 
and leaders, has been present in Hungary since the regime change, and prevailed both within 
individual political parties and the entire political system (Ádám 2018).
In 2010-14, Orbán made the constitutional system even more majority-based, effectively 
dismantling all checks and balances on government power (Tóth 2012, Kornai 2015). In 2014, 
Fidesz was reelected, and Orbán continued to govern. At the time of writing, he is set to gain 
yet another overwhelming electoral victory at the spring 2018 general elections, and Hungary 
is expected to remain governed by him for at least four more years. His success was based 
on a characteristically authoritarian populist policy mix: He has centralized power, made 
government economically more active, built an extensive clientele, and heavily reallocated 
resources to the benefit of his supporter base. State ownership expanded, income inequalities 
grew, while fiscal redistribution stayed as high as it was before, with significantly less 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, though.
4.1. Left- or right? Right
Although their policies have exhibited a number of leftwing characteristics, Orbán’s 
governments have pursued an explicitly rightwing version of authoritarian populism. 
Ideologically they are nationalistic and define the political community on an ethno-cultural 
basis. Their self-identification has been manifestly rightwing, allegedly standing up for 
conservative and religious values, even if in actual terms this has rather been a secular 
pseudo-religion than Christianity and religious conservatism (Ádám and Bozóki 2016a).
Orbán’s policies explicitly prefer middle class economic interests. First, this is again a 
manifestly declared policy goal: Strengthening an ethno-culturally defined Hungarian 
middle class that supports national interests embodied in local (as opposed to global or 
foreign) political initiatives carries a high priority in Orbán’s political discourse. Second, 
redistribution policies, including policies on taxation and social benefits, have been also 
characterized by strong middle class biases.
Since 2010, Orbán has introduced a f lat income tax that brought about a large reduction 
in tax burden of average and higher incomes whereas it increased the tax burden on low 
incomes. In addition, generous income tax holidays after children made tax burden of middle 
class families particularly low. In contrast, lower income big families simply do not have 
enough revenues to claim these benefits. In the meantime, child benefits, paid after children 
regardless of family income, have not risen but lost part of their real value, particularly hitting 
low income big families, many of them being Roma (Inglot et al. 2012). Generous housing 
finance schemes have been also introduced to the benefit of high income families, able to buy 
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or build new houses. Finally, the polarization of state-administered pensions, started in the 
pre-2010 period, continued as a high replacement ratio and undifferentiated pension hikes 
made middle class pensions grow faster than pensions of lower income earners (Ádám and 
Simonovits 2017).
Some of Orbán’s policies have exhibited a less explicit pro-middle class bias. Importantly, 
utility prices have been administratively cut by the government in 2012-14, significantly 
boosting the popularity of the regime and the reelection chances of Orbán in 2014. Cutting 
utility prices at first sight appears a pro-poor measure, and to some extent it indeed is. 
However, middle classes also enjoy lower utility prices, especially those having a large house. 
Moreover, the utility price cut was part of Orbán’s scheme of redistributing markets of utility 
industries: These were privatized in the 1990s for large foreign firms by the then governing 
Socialists and Liberals, whereas Orbán partly renationalized them after 2010. Cutting utility 
prices was an incentive for foreign firms to withdraw from the market and relinquish their 
previous investments in a formerly friendly, recently hostile-turned business environment 
(Ámon and Deák 2015, pp. 95-96).
Orbán also levied special industry-specific taxes on banking, energy provision, 
telecommunication and food retail trade. Apart from raising additional budgetary revenues, 
these taxes also gave incentives for large foreign companies to leave the Hungarian market, 
and let the government control it directly through regulation, nationalization and – in some 
cases – re-privatization to friendly businesses. The policy goal was to strengthen local capital 
accumulation and support government-sponsored business clienteles through the allocation 
of market shares and preferential government provisions, often at – or beyond – the edge of 
legalized corruption (cf. Fazekas and Tóth 2016, CRCB 2016).8 
4.2. Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion
Successive Orbán governments – like any other authoritarian populists – have always made 
explicit who were ‘us’ and who were ‘them’ from their perspective. Orbán has always placed 
a great political emphasis on creating deep social divisions between his camp and their 
opposition. He has acted like a feudal landlord among his subjects, always appreciating 
loyalty and punishing individualism. Traditionally, the dividing characteristics he used were 
attitudes to the communist past, to the outside world, to national identity and to Christianism.
Ideologically, Orbán’s ‘us’ were the non-communist, ethno-culturally Hungarian, Christian, 
‘civic’ (i.e. non-proletarian) Hungarians. Upon losing the 2002 elections to the Socialists, 
however, he revised this basis of identification by incorporating more plebeian-populist 
elements. He changed his dress-code and, to some extent, even his language, to appear and 
sound more authentically identical with the people. Eventually, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis and the ensuing fiscal stabilization by the then governing center left, Orbán 
made this kind of inclusive ‘us’, consisting both plebeian and aristocratic elements, victorious.
Another important economic and social policy measure playing a major role in creating 
ingroup-outgroup dynamics has been the expansion of public work programs. In these, 
8  Another form of providing government secured rents for friendly businesses was the creation of local tobacco retail 
sales monopolies that were typically allocated among Fidesz-friendly local businesses.
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hundreds of thousands of people have been included who otherwise would have typically 
stayed economically inactive. They have earned miserable wages but still enjoyed some degree 
of income stability. To make the program more attractive, the government reduced social 
benefits of those out of work, including both the unemployed and those who had been out of 
the labor market on a permanent basis. 
Public work programs seldom make participants economically more competitive. Instead, 
participants often get stuck in these programs (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár 2015), making 
them dependent on government policies and, in particular, local authorities who directly 
employ them in most public work scheme. Especially in villages and small towns this can 
contribute to the re-feudalization of power relations, while at the same time responding to the 
negative stereotypes of the public about the scores of ‘lazy inactive’ people, among whom the 
Roma are overrepresented (Kertesi and Kézdi 2011). Hence, public work programs have been 
instrumental in making the distinction between included and excluded sections of society 
salient and tangible, and creating a hierarchical relationship between the two. 
Nevertheless, inclusion-exclusion dynamics have been restructured by Orbán since the last 
general elections. The 2014 elections were to a significant extent won by Orbán through utility 
price cuts that symbolized the regulation of markets and the emphasis on living conditions. 
The message was that ordinary people were not any more at the mercy of businesses but were 
protected by the government, delivering tangible financial gains to them at the cost of foreign 
investors. 
Importantly and interestingly, Orbán has formulated a new message since then. With the 
start of the European migrant and refugee crisis in 2015, he gained an opportunity to redefine 
ingroup—outgroup dynamics along ideologically determined ethno-national lines. Fencing 
Hungary both ideologically and physically, Orbán was able to offer ingroup membership to 
all prepared to accept the boundaries of ‘us’ he proposed, and recognize him as the leader of 
the nation. He went against the EU and identified Hungary as a no-refugee zone, refusing 
to adhere to the principles of international human rights and EU law. This way, an ethno-
culturally constructed ideological differentiation became the basis of new ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics.
5. Conclusions
In this paper I argued that populism is a degraded form of democratic politics that seeks 
to eliminate its political rivals while maintaining popular legitimation through multiparty 
elections. Whether on the left or the right side of the political spectrum, populism is always 
illiberal. It projects a unidimensional political space in which populist contenders represent 
themselves as the true and only true representatives of the people, rejecting the legitimacy of 
any other claim to power. This way, populists simplify complicated social and political reality, 
and seek to reduce effective political choice. Hence, they reduce political transaction costs.
Political transaction costs, I argued, are the costs of conducting horizontal political 
exchange among autonomous political actors. Being the legitimate representatives of their 
own convictions and interests without being institutionally subordinated to any other political 
actors, members of democratic societies impose significant political transaction costs on 
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each other by making political exchange unpredictable, situated in a multidimensional social 
space. As societies cannot always afford to bear these costs, populism appears to be in need 
from time to time even in rich, developed, first world countries.
I also argued that leftwing populists tend to redistribute to the benefit of the poor and 
use socialism or Marxism as an ideological basis. Rightwing populists, in turn, typically 
redistribute less, and place political emphasis on ethno-cultural nationalism. Both left- and 
rightwing populists tend to be anti-liberal and authoritarian, as a number of examples in Latin 
America and elsewhere suggest. A new type of North-Western European rightwing populism 
tends to exhibit an increasingly liberal worldview with respect to individual freedoms – as 
long as the freedom of migrants and refugees are not concerned.
Apart from the left-right political divide, populists – as many other anti-liberal political 
regime – apply ingroup-outgroup dynamics to structure political space. Members of ingroups 
are preferred by redistributive policies (and often also by symbolic politics). They are part 
of the official ‘us’, and they are meant to be the social core of the regime. Their interests are 
served by the regime and their systematic advantages are presented as legitimate politically. 
That is why corruption charges often remain non-effective against populist regimes: They 
are of course corrupt in the sense of systematically preferring particular groups of society, 
but this is a quasi-legitimate political pattern as long as they prefer members of the ingroup.
Both the left-right divide and the ingroup-outgroup divide reduce political transaction 
costs by conditioning political exchange and reducing effective political choice. This way, 
redistributive patterns get stabilized and the allocation of power may remain unchanged 
over a protracted period of time. Importantly, this is not to say that predictability of political 
actions increases from the point of view of individual political or business actors.9 The 
rule of law, in fact, deteriorates. What becomes more predictable and hence eliminates a 
considerable amount of uncertainties surrounding political exchange is the survival of the 
regime with its patterns of redistribution and allocation of power. In societies characterized 
by a limited capacity of people to hold their government accountable and impose checks 
on power, such political stability appears attractive as opposed to its alternative, which is 
essentially anarchy.10 In other words, societies that lack formal and informal institutions and 
their mutual reinforcement necessary for maintaining liberal democracy, populism becomes 
a viable political option of maintaining a ‘degraded form of democracy’ – and hence avoiding 
outright dictatorship.
I argued that this is what precisely happened in Hungary after 2010. Having experienced 
a deepening political and economic crisis of liberal democratic governance in the late 2000s, 
Hungarians identified Vikor Orbán’s illiberal approach to power as a promising alternative 
of a more stable and predictable political regime. Orbán’s reign well might be corrupt, 
redistributing to the benefit of a business clientele at a mass scale, yet it provides a sufficient 
amount of benefits for a sufficient number of people in a stable and predictable manner so 
that it has a fair chance to survive the 2018 elections.
  9  I am grateful to the participants of the departmental seminar of CEU’s Department of Political Science, especially Zsolt 
Enyedi, for drawing my attention to this point.
10  Weingast (1997) associate the capability of people to hold their government accountable and curb governmental 
transgressions with the existence of ‘focal solutions’ to the problem of collective action.
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